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Abstract
This thesis examines three questions of causality relevant to public finance and labor
economics: the effect of racial segregation on city characteristics, the effect of divorce on
women's economic outcomes, and the effect of abortion legalization on completed
fertility.
Chapter one examines the effect of segregation on cities. There is a strikingly negative
city-level correlation between residential racial segregation and population outcomes-
particularly for black residents-but it is widely recognized that this correlation may not
be causal. This chapter provides a novel test of the causal relationship between
segregation and population outcomes by exploiting the arrangements of railroad tracks in
the 19th century to isolate plausibly exogenous variation in a city's susceptibility to
segregation. I show that, conditional on miles of railroad track laid, the extent to which
track configurations physically subdivided cities strongly predicts the level of segregation
that ensued after the Great Migration of African-Americans to northern and western cities
in the 20th century. Prior to the Great Migration, however, track configurations were
uncorrelated with racial concentration, income, education and population, indicating that
reverse causality is unlikely. Instrumental variables estimates find that segregation leads
to negative characteristics for blacks and high-skilled whites, but positive characteristics
for low-skilled whites. Segregation could generate these effects either by affecting human
capital acquisition of residents of different races and skill groups ('production') or by
inducing sorting of race and skill groups into different cities ('selection'). I develop a
model to distinguish between production and selection effects. The findings are most
consistent with the view that more segregated cities produce better outcomes for low-
skilled whites and that more segregated cities are in less demand among both blacks and
whites, implying that Americans on average value integration.
Chapter two, coauthored with Guy Michaels, examines the effect of divorce on women's
economic outcomes. Having a female firstborn child significantly increases the
probability that a woman's first marriage breaks up. We exploit this exogenous variation
to measure the effect of marital breakup on women's economic outcomes. We find
evidence that divorce has little effect on a woman's average household income, but
significantly increases the probability that her household will be in the lowest income
quartile. While women partially offset the loss of spousal earnings with child support,
2
welfare, combining households, and substantially increasing their labor supply, divorce
significantly increases the odds of household poverty on net.
Chapter three, coauthored with Jonathan Gruber and Phillip B. Levine, examines the
effect of abortion legalization on completed fertility. Previous research has convincingly
shown that abortion legalization in the early 1970s led to a significant drop in fertility at
that time. But this decline may have either represented a delay in births from a point
where they were "unintended" to a point where they were "intended," or they may have
represented a permanent reduction in fertility. We combine data from the 1970 U.S.
Census and microdata from 1968 to 1999 Vital Statistics records to calculate lifetime
fertility of women in the 1930s through 1960s birth cohorts. We examine whether those
women who were born in early legalizing states and who passed through the early 1970s
in their peak childbearing years had differential lifetime fertility patterns compared to
women born in other states and in different birth cohorts. We consider the impact of
abortion legalization on both the number of children ever born as well as the distribution
of number of children ever born. Our results indicate that much of the reduction in
fertility at the time abortion was legalized was permanent in that women did not have
more subsequent births as a result. We also find that this result is largely attributable to
an increase in the number of women who remained childless throughout their fertile
years.
Thesis Supervisor: Jonathan Gruber
Title: Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: David Autor
Title: Associate Professor of Economics
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The Wrong Side(s) of the Tracks:




There is a strikingly negative city-level correlation between residential racial segregation
and population outcomes-particularly for black residents-but it is widely recognized
that this correlation may not be causal. This paper provides a novel test of the causal
relationship between segregation and population outcomes by exploiting the
arrangements of railroad tracks in the 19t century to isolate plausibly exogenous
variation in a city's susceptibility to segregation. I show that, conditional on miles of
railroad track laid, the extent to which track configurations physically subdivided cities
strongly predicts the level of segregation that ensued after the Great Migration of
African-Americans to northern and western cities in the 20th century. Prior to the Great
Migration, however, track configurations were uncorrelated with racial concentration,
income, education and population, indicating that reverse causality is unlikely.
Instrumental variables estimates find that segregation leads to negative characteristics for
blacks and high-skilled whites, but positive characteristics for low-skilled whites.
Segregation could generate these effects either by affecting human capital acquisition of
residents of different races and skill groups ('production') or by inducing sorting of race
and skill groups into different cities ('selection'). I develop a model to distinguish
between production and selection effects. The findings are most consistent with the view
that more segregated cities produce better outcomes for low-skilled whites and that more
segregated cities are in less demand among both blacks and whites, implying that
Americans on average value integration.
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I. Introduction
Residential segregation by race is one of the most visible characteristics of many
American cities. Although African-Americans represent just over one-tenth of the U.S.
population, the average urban African-American lives in a neighborhood that is majority
black (Glaeser and Vigdor 2001). Cities vary in the extent to which their black
populations live in black neighborhoods, and more segregated cities on average have
worse characteristics than less segregated cities, on measures ranging from infant
mortality to educational achievement (Massey and Denton 1993).
This correlation is difficult to interpret, however. In what ways, if any, racial
segregation causally affects outcomes is a longstanding question in social science. Two
conceptual obstacles complicate identifying the answer. First, some economic, political,
or other attributed may lead some cities to have more segregation and also more negative
city characteristics. This will cause omitted variable bias when estimating the bivariate
relationship between segregation and city outcomes. Instrumenting for a city's level of
segregation can help address this problem, thereby allowing the effect of segregation on
macro city-level outcomes to be estimated.
A second conceptual obstacle arises from the fact that, although segregation must
affect aggregate city characteristics through some effect on individuals, there at least two
different ways it can do so. First, segregated cities may be less productive, leading to
lower accumulation of capital (human and otherwise) for its citizens. Second, people
may respond to segregation itself, and to any effects segregation has on production, by
sorting between cities in ways that alter average city characteristics. Both of these
phenomena are of economic interest, but only the first can be considered a causal effect
' For example, greater political corruption or a more industrial economy.
of segregation on the outcomes of people. The combination of the two, which is easier to
observe, must be considered an effect of segregation on places.
In this paper I address concerns about omitted variable bias by using 19th-century
railroad configurations to instrument for the extent to which cities became segregated as
they developed African-American populations during the 20th century. I show that the
proverbial convention of the "wrong side of the tracks" is helpful in identifying
segregation; the more subdivided a city was by railroads (i.e., the more total "sides" there
were to the tracks) the more segregated the city became during the Great Migration.
As a city began to develop a significant black population during the Great
Migration, African-Americans became isolated in ghettoes in part because demand
among the broader community for residential segregation grew (Weaver 1955). As the
black population continued to expand, the physical size of a ghetto had to increase if
segregation was going to be maintained. Since railroads generate neighborhood
divisions, cities that were subdivided by railroads into many small insular neighborhoods
could expand a ghetto by one neighborhood at a time and still practice "containment,"
whereby the black population remained concentrated and contiguous. On the other hand,
in cities where expanding a ghetto meant breaching a main divide, then as the black
population increased segregation could no longer be as easily maintained.2
Figure 1 illustrates this concept. Binghamton, NY, and York, PA, were similar in
total quantity of railroad tracks laid by 1900 (shown in red, circumscribed by a four
kilometer-radius circle). They also had similar industrial bases and substantial changes in
2 The proverb does not explain why it is that railroads tend to define neighborhood boundaries, although in
many cases it is self-evident that they do. One likely possibility is that a railroad provides a clear
demarcation that facilitates collective agreement on neighborhood boundaries by residents, real estate
agents, police, and others. When a community is interested in remaining separate from a certain group,
railroads could facilitate collective action in enforcing segregation by reducing coordination costs.
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African-American population (these characteristics are discussed in detail later in the
paper). But York's railroads were configured such that they created many insular
neighborhoods, particularly in the center of the city. Its Census tracts, in the year 2000,
show a black population more concentrated in this set of small, railroad-defined
neighborhoods (tract percent black is represented by darkness of tract shading). In
Binghamton, on the other hand, railroads are tightly clustered, leaving some areas too
long and narrow to encompass neighborhoods and others too wide open to create
meaningful population restrictions. In contrast to York, Binghamton's year 2000 Census
tracts show its black population dispersed lightly and evenly throughout much of the city.
My research design relies on the assumption that the variation I observe in the
railroad subdivision of neighborhoods, conditional on total track laid in a city, is
exogenous. I provide a variety of tests of the validity of this assumption. Under this
assumption, instrumentation allows me to identify the extent to which cities that initially
are randomly assigned greater segregation end up having more negative characteristics
overall. That is, it identifies the causal effect of segregation on places.
To identify the effect of segregation on people, it is necessary to determine how
much of a city's characteristics result from the production effects of segregation and how
much from the migration effects. I develop a simple model in which cities' equilibrium
characteristics are driven by race, tastes, production effects of segregation, and relative
housing demand. This model produces implications that I am then able to test
empirically, providing some speculative estimates that decompose the macro effects of
segregation on places into the effects on people and the effects on migration.
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A number of other papers have attempted to measure the effects of segregation on
outcomes (cf. Massey and Denton 1993, Wilson 1996, Polednak 1997). An influential
contribution by Cutler and Glaeser (1997), which includes a rich discussion of the
problems of omitted variable bias and endogenous migration, is significantly limited in
its ability to address those problems because they lack a plausible instrument. In place of
an instrument they impose a variety of exclusion restrictions. Their main empirical
estimates depend on the identifying restriction that segregation has no effect on whites, so
that within cities white outcomes provide a counterfactual for what black outcomes
would be in the absence of segregation. My results, by contrast, suggest that segregation
has significant effects on whites and that assuming otherwise produces incorrect
estimates of the effects of segregation on blacks.3
In some specifications, Cutler and Glaeser use an approach more similar in spirit
to that used here, instrumenting for a city's level of segregation with its number of rivers.
In practice, however, my approach, using railroads, is quite different. Railroads, unlike
rivers, predict division on a small scale-at the neighborhood rather than municipal level.
This means, first, that unlike rivers (Hoxby 1994) railroads do not separately predict
confounding metropolitan characteristics such as intergovernmental competition.
Secondly, it means that railroads identify neighborhood-level segregation, which is the
level that the literature has generally considered relevant and is the level that segregation
indices measure. Most importantly, railroad division strongly and robustly predicts
segregation. Therefore, I argue that the use of railroad division provides ex-ante a more
compelling answer to the question of the effects of segregation on places than has
3 For example, I find that Cutler and Glaeser's results overstate the negative effects of segregation on low-
skilled blacks because their strategy misses the positive effects of segregation on low-skilled whites.
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previously been proposed. It can then allow research to proceed to the next important
question-the effects of segregation on people.
My results on the overall effects of instrumented segregation suggest that,
consistent with observed correlation, greater segregation causes cities to have black
populations with worse present-day characteristics, both at the top and the bottom of the
education/income distribution. Within the white population, segregation results in worse
characteristics at the top of the skill distribution and better characteristics at the bottom.
This relationship is obscured in ordinary least squares estimation, possibly because other
omitted local characteristics that lead to broader inequality also lead to more segregation.
My results when looking separately at production and migration suggest that
segregation actually leads to better outcomes for low-skilled whites. For other groups, it
is not possible to distinguish between direct effects of segregation on individual outcomes
and effects on average group characteristics due to selective migration. For all groups,
there is no evidence of preferences for segregated cities, and there is some evidence that
Americans on average have tastes for integration.
II. Some facts about U.S. segregation
The history of urban American racial segregation can be divided into four periods.
In the 19th century, very few African-Americans lived outside of the South. This changed
rapidly during the Great Migration (roughly 1915 to 1950), when large numbers of
African-Americans migrated into Northern and Western cities from the South. Cities
became highly segregated as their urban black populations grew (Cutler et al. 1999).
Much of this segregation resulted not from market forces but from deliberate government
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policies and collective action by white residents (Massey and Denton 1993).
Government policy towards segregation then changed gradually during the civil rights
era, and a clear break in housing policy came in 1968 with the Fair Housing Act.
Subsequent stated government policies on housing segregation have been neutral or have
explicitly endorsed integration, but cities today continue overwhelmingly to exhibit high
degrees of neighborhood segregation (Cutler et al. 1999). Segregation appears to persist
despite the fact that significant proportions of Americans now state preferences for
integrated neighborhoods (Ananat and Siegel 2002) and that, at a macro level, the U.S.
population has in recent years been migrating to less-segregated cities (Glaeser and
Vigdor 2001).
Two explanations can reconcile the survey and macro evidence that people prefer
integration with the micro-level evidence (Emerson et al. 2001, Bayer et al. 2005,
Goering et al. 2002) that within cities they continue to choose segregated neighborhoods.
First, attempts to provide integration for people who have tastes for it may suffer from a
collective action problem (Schelling 1971, Ananat and Siegel 2002). Second, integrated
cities may be more efficient than segregated cities, at least for some people. For
example, if there are neighborhood effects on individual outcomes and the black and
white populations differ in their distribution of skill types, then blacks and whites will
have different outcomes in more segregated cities. If these types are substitutes in the
production of neighborhood effects, then separating blacks from whites in neighborhood
production will be inefficient, causing people to sort away from less-productive
segregated cities.
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In theory, the productivity of segregation relative to integration is ambiguous in
sign. For example, Tiebout sorting suggests that, if demand for neighborhood public
goods varies less within race than within an entire city, then segregation is efficient.
Segregation of blacks (relatively low-skilled) from whites (relatively high-skilled) would
also be efficient if the high-skilled are complements in the production of public goods.
Productivity effects of and tastes for segregation may act in tandem. For
example, after initial assignment to a city with a given level of segregation, rational
agents sort away from that city based both on tastes and on any efficiency cost or benefit
of segregation. If, for example, people have tastes for integration and integration is
efficient, then, since willingness to pay is a function of income, high types will select into
integrated cities, which will further reinforce the correlation of integration and positive
outcomes.
III. Research Design
The ideal approach to identifying the effects of segregation on people and on
places would require actual random assignment within an experimental framework. The
experimental design would involve two otherwise identical cities with small open
economies, one that would be kept perfectly residentially segregated by race (the
treatment city), and another that would be kept perfectly integrated (the control city).
At time zero, each city would receive the same total number of blacks and the
same total number of whites, with individuals assigned randomly to one city or the other.
By virtue of random assignment, each city's within-race and overall skill distribution
would start out equal to that of the other city. Restricting individuals from moving, one
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could then observe, over generations, the overall and within-race outcomes in each city.4
Absent migration, differences in these outcomes would reflect both the effect of
segregation on individuals and the effect on the population characteristics of places-
since population would be fixed, the two effects would not be conceptually different.
Within-race outcomes would identify whether segregation was beneficial or harmful for
each group; which city had better aggregate outcomes would identify whether
segregation is more or less efficient than integration for society as a whole.
The quasi-experiment generated by railroad division
The actual quasi-experiment that railroads provide does not perfectly follow the
framework described above. Instead of a technology that results in being either perfectly
segregated or perfectly integrated, railroad technology for segregation varies by degrees.
To accept the estimates of segregation effects I derive, it is necessary to assume that the
effects are monotonic. In addition, whites and blacks were not randomly assigned to
cities; it is necessary to assume that individuals did not sort selectively based on railroad
division. However, as I will show, there is no evidence of pre-period differences in cities
based on railroad division that would cause individuals to sort selectively; they would
have had to predict the effects of railroad division subsequent to black inflows, which
seems unlikely.
4 The standard model (Roback 1982) of the way wages and rents adjust for city consumption amenities that
are productive (e.g. temperate climate) or unproductive (e.g. clean air) is inapplicable here. It requires that
an amenity have the same productivity effects for all residents, a restriction that is inappropriate in the case
of segregation. It is much more plausible to assume, to the contrary, that segregation has the effect of
concentrating resources in the white community, making segregation more productive for whites than for
blacks. This will be true both because the skill and resource distribution of whites dominates that of blacks
and because whites typically outnumber blacks, with the political result of redistribution towards the white
community. Moreover, the clearest way to model the effects of differential resources over time is with a
multigenerational model rather than the one-period model in Roback (1982). Therefore I opt to model the
production of type in the next generation, with type-specific wages fixed across cities, rather than city-
determined productivity conditional on type.
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To believe that railroad division can identify the effect of segregation on people, it
is necessary to assume that individuals do not move. This assumption is plainly not
credible; however, it is also not necessary to identify effect on places.
IV. Empirical Strategy
Segregation can be modeled as a classic endogenous regressor affecting outcomes
at the city level,
(1)Seg = aZ + 2X + U
(2) Y = l,Seg + 2X +,
and then estimated using two-stage least squares analysis. The right-hand side variable of
interest in equation (2), Seg , represents a city's current level of segregation. Segregation
is captured by a dissimilarity index, which measures the difference between the
distribution of blacks by neighborhood and their total representation in the metropolitan
area as a whole. Dissimilarity is defined as
N I black. nonblack i(3) Index of dissimilarity = 2 , blacks - nonblacki
i= blackotal nonblacktota,
where i = l... N is the array of census tracts in the area. It can be considered the answer
to the question, "What percent of blacks (or non-blacks) would have to move to a
different census tract in order for the proportion black in each neighborhood to equal the
proportion black in the city as a whole?" Note that an index of zero is improbable in the
absence of central planning.
Outcomes, represented by Y in equation (2), include the proportions of a city's
blacks and whites who are poor, unemployed, high-school dropouts, college graduates, or
who have household incomes above $150,000. The first three outcomes should reflect
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primarily characteristics of a city's low-skilled population, who are more likely to be on
the margin of poverty, unemployment, and dropping out of high school. The last two
outcomes should reflect primarily characteristics of a city's high-skilled population.
The instrument, Z, is a measure of a city's railroad-induced potential for
segregation. Z quantifies the extent to which the city's land is divided into smaller units
by railroads. I define a "railroad division index," or RDI, which is a variation on a
Herfindahl index that measures the dispersion of city land into subunits.
(4) RDI =1 areaighborhoodi
areatotal
If a city were completely undivided by railroads, so that the area of its single
neighborhood was 100% of the total city area, the RDI would equal 0. If a city were
infinitely divided by railroads, so that each neighborhood had area near zero, the RDI
would equal 1. The more subdivided a city, the more "sides" there are to its tracks, and
the more possible boundaries between groups are available to use as barriers enforcing
segregation. In particular, if railroads created many small neighborhoods that adjoin each
other, it would have been possible during the Great Migration to relieve pent-up housing
demand by allowing a ghetto to expand into an adjacent neighborhood, while still
maintaining a new railroad barrier between the ghetto and the rest of the city. This
should have facilitated persistent segregation even as the black population increased.
For variation in track configuration to be a valid instrument for segregation, it
must result from random factors, such as minor variations in gradient, natural resource
location, or direction to the next city-factors that amount to noise in aggregate. Any
factors that drive both railroad configuration and city outcomes must be included as
controls. X denotes a vector of city characteristics that affect railroad configuration and
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city outcomes. The most important of these is total track length, because there is a
mechanical correlation between the total length of track and the division of the city by
track. If total length of track is related to other features of the city, such as industrial
composition or land quality, then length of track may predict city outcomes on its own,
not because of the way track divides the city. Therefore all regressions in the paper
control for total track length.
Other possible confounding factors include: manufacturing share-more
manufacturing-oriented cities may differ in their routing of railroads; region-cities in
the Northeast or Midwest may have different geography and different outcomes from
those in the West; and black population inflows-African-Americans may have chosen
cities based on different tastes for railroad breakup. I perform specification checks to test
for explanatory power of these possible confounders. I run regressions including either
1920 manufacturing share or region dummies. I also instrument for black population
inflows using data from Dresser (1994). She demonstrates that during World War II,
some cities received larger war contracts per capita than others, leading to larger labor
shortages in some cities than in others. She further shows that larger per-capita war
contracts predicted higher inflows of African-Americans during World War II. I draw on
Dresser's work by using per-capita war contracts as an instrument for greater black
inflows during the Great Migration and including it in reduced form as a control in the
analysis.5
5 Railroad-induced segregation technology should have proved differentially useful in cities with high
exogenous inflows of blacks. In cities with large exogenous changes in African-American population,
which therefore had high demand for segregation, available segregation technology would have made more
of a difference in the resultant degree of separation of blacks and whites. In cities with low inflows, where
segregation did not become a salient demand, differences in the technology for producing segregation
would have been less relevant to the equilibrium dispersion of blacks and whites and to city outcomes.
This has the empirical implication that railroad subdivision should matter more in cities where a rapidly
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The chronology of the Great Migration provides a further specification check.
The validity of railroad division as an instrument relies on the assumption that division
affected cities only by facilitating segregation of significant African-American
populations. Therefore there would be cause for concern about validity if railroad
division predicted city outcomes prior to the Great Migration. To test this assumption, I
estimate equations (1) and (2) using pre-Great Migration city characteristics as dependent
variables. These pre-period "outcomes" include manufacturing, labor force participation
rate, average income, population, physical city size, percent black, and literacy rate. The
ideal year to measure these characteristics would be 1910, the last Census year before the
beginning of the Great Migration, when nearly 90% of African-Americans still lived in
slave states. Measuring later, however, should bias specification tests toward failure, to
the extent that cities may have already begun to differ due to segregation; my estimates,
which use 1920 characteristics, therefore provide an especially strong test of the validity
of the instrument.
I examine the characteristics of cities' black and white populations separately,
since these groups would not be expected to respond identically to segregation. The two-
stage least squares estimate allows me to measure the effect of railroad-induced
segregation on city outcomes. The difference between the two-stage and ordinary least
squares estimates can provide a sense of whether segregation that occurs endogenously is
obscuring or intensifying the observed correspondence between segregation and group
characteristics.
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increasing black population increased whites' utility of segregation. Unfortunately, the railroad division
index and the proxy for WWII labor shortage do not provide enough power to estimate that interaction. I
therefore confine my estimates to the main effect of each, by controlling for per-capita war contracts in the
standard regression specification.
I test whether the population flows of each race are positive or negative, and also
whether individuals of each race face relatively higher or lower rent and mortgage costs
in more segregated cities. Differences in housing costs would not be a valid measure of
city demand if they are driven by variation in the cost of living or by the amount of
housing consumed in more versus less segregated cities. To test for this possibility, I
examine costs as a percent of income and I examine household crowdedness.
Differences between the overall change in a city's skill distribution and that
explained by migration represent the city's production of skill. For example, the percent
change in a city's population of young high school dropouts, conditional on net migration
of young high school dropouts, can provide an upper bound for the effect of city
production on the size of the low-skill population. A similar argument holds for college
graduates. By breaking down these differences by race, the race-specific production
effects of segregation can be bounded. I therefore examine population change and net
migration by race and education.
V. Data
Sample
My major data sources are U.S. Census Bureau reports on metropolitan
demographics (various years), information on 19th century railroad configuration
extracted from archival maps, measures of metropolitan segregation from Cutler and
Glaeser (1997), and a replication of Dresser's data using city-level total war contracts and
total population information from the 1947 County Data Book.
My ideal sample would include all places outside the South that were
incorporated prior to the Great Migration, so that they were potential destinations for
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African-Americans leaving the South. Then the growth of the place itself into an MSA
could be treated as an outcome of its potential segregation. Because the Census only
provides data for large places, however, it is not possible to get pre-period information
for places that were small at the time of the Great Migration.
My sample of cities is chosen as follows. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) provide data
for MSAs with at least 1000 black residents. Of these MSAs, I include only those in
states that were not slave-owning at the time of the Civil War, because these were the
states that had few African-Americans prior to the Great Migration.6 Further, my sample
was limited by the set of historical maps held by the Harvard Map Library. The library
depends on donations and estate purchases, etc., to collect maps, and therefore there are
gaps in its collection. I have compared the full non-South Cutler and Glaeser (1997)
sample to the sample available from the Harvard Map Library. The cities for which the
library could not provide maps tend to have been smaller cities in the 19th century but
otherwise do not appear different in either historical or current characteristics. My final
sample consists of 134 urban areas.
Maps
The maps that provide railroad placement information were created by the U.S.
Geological Survey as part of an effort to document the country's topography, beginning
in the 1880s.7 These maps display elevation, bodies of water, roads, railroads, and (in
6 Specifically, I exclude Delaware, Maryland, Washington, DC, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Texas,
and Arkansas. Nearly 90% of African-Americans resided in one of these states in 1910 (author's
calculation from 1910 IPUMS data).
7 The median map year in my sample is 1909, prior to the start of the Great Migration. The observations in
the maps should primarily reflect 19t century railroads, since 75% of the total track laid in the United
States was in place by 1900 (Atack and Passell 1994, p. 430)
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many cases) individual representations of non-residential buildings and private homes.8
The edges of a 15-minute map are exogenously defined in round 15-minute units, so that,
for example, a map will extend from -90°30'00" longitude and 43045'00 ' latitude (in the
southeast corner) to -90045'00' longitude and 44000'00' latitude (in the northwest corner)
Because the Harvard Map Library collection is incomplete, there are 77 cities in
non-South states available in the Cutler and Glaeser data for which I do not have the
necessary map observations. In addition, in 15 cities I observe only some fraction of the
four-kilometer-radius land area I wish to observe, since the cities overlap two or more 15-
minute areas and I have maps only for some subset of those areas. Finally, in 40 cases
the city overlaps multiple areas and I observe all of the areas.
The process of extracting railroad information from the maps is illustrated in
Figure 2. For each city, its map or maps were used first to identify its physical size,
shape and location at the time its map was made. A Geographic Information Systems
program, ArcGIS, was used to create a convex polygon that was the smallest such
polygon that could contain the entire densely inhabited urban area. Dense habitation,
defined as including any area with houses and frequent, regular cross-streets, was
identified by visual examination. ArcGIS was then used to identify the centroid of this
polygon, and this point was defined as the historical city center. A four-kilometer radius
circle around this point became the level of observation for the measurement of railroads.
This approach meant that differences in initial city area would not distort the
measurement of initial railroads: cities that were, at the time, very small would still be
coded with railroads that affected later development, after the population had expanded;
8 In some cities with relatively dense areas, some center-city blocks are marked as continuously inhabited,
rather than showing individual structures. The outskirts of every inhabited area, however, do show
individual structures.
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cities that were already large would have only those railroads in their center cities
included. It should be noted, however, that about 75% of the cities were smaller than 16a
square kilometers when mapped, and many were much smaller, so for most cities this
measure includes railroads that were laid on unoccupied land without need to consider
habitation.
Visual examination reveals that the historical city center created in this way is
typically quite close to what would be identified as the current city center if using a
current map. Within this four-kilometer circle, every railroad was identified, its length
measured, and the area of the "neighborhoods" created by its intersections with each
other railroad calculated. Historical railroads predict the borders of current
neighborhoods as identified by the Census quite well. The actual land area within the
circle was also calculated, so that measurement could be adjusted for available observed
land when working with maps that truncate city observations or include substantial
bodies of water.
Segregation Indices
I use the Cutler/Glaeser/Vigdor segregation data provided online by Vigdor
(2001). These data come from various decennial Censuses, and include 19 th and 20t
century historical segregation indices and metropolitan characteristics from Cutler and
Glaeser (1997), 1990 GIS-dependent measures of segregation based on Census data from
Cutler et al. (1999), and additional data from the 2000 Census from Glaeser and Vigdor
(2001). These data include dissimilarity indices for every decade from 1890 to 2000. In
addition, they provide four other measures of segregation, all based on those developed in
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Massey and Denton (1988). These include an index of isolation, available for every
decade from 1890 to 2000, which provides a different way to organize the same
information contained in the dissimilarity index and is highly correlated with the
dissimilarity index. Supplementary measures of clustering, concentration, and
centralization-all of which rely on geographical data about the proximity, size, and
location of a city's census tracts-are available for 1990. Dissimilarity is the standard
measure of segregation in the literature, and I use the dissimilarity index throughout the
paper, while also testing the robustness of my instrument to alternative segregation
measures.
Census Measures of Urban Characteristics
I collect city outcomes from published Census reports (U.S. Census Bureau
2005). Although at the time that tracks were laid each of these cities was physically
separated by open space from other cities, over the last century urban growth has meant
that many once-distinct metropolitan areas are now conglomerates. To surmount this
problem, I collect data for the reporting area which best centers on the original city center
without containing other original city centers.
Thus I use MSA-level data for the 64 cities that have remained independent
MSAs. For MSAs in which multiple city centers are each in a separate county, I assign
to each city the characteristics for the county that holds that city's original urban center.
Doing so allows me to differentiate between the effect of an original center on its county
level outcomes and the combined effect of several centers on MSA-level outcomes (e.g.
outcomes for the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island Consolidated MSA).
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Fifty-three cities are in unique counties but share an MSA with at least one other city.
Finally, for the 17 cities that share a single county with another city, I assign the
characteristics of the politically-defined city itself to the observation.
I use Census data collected at these MSA, county, or municipal levels to derive
city outcomes by race. These outcomes include education, labor force characteristics,
poverty, distribution of income, median rent and mortgage costs, housing costs as a
percent of income, percent of households with more than one person per room, and
proportion of residents who are new to the area.
VI. Results
First stage
Table 1 shows that, controlling for track per square kilometer in the historical city
center, the neighborhood RDI generated by the configuration of track strongly predicts
the metropolitan dissimilarity index in 1990. Adding a control for pre-period
manufacturing composition does not significantly affect the relationship between railroad
division and current segregation.9 Nor does adding per-capita war contracts as a proxy
for exogenous black inflows. The regression in column 4 includes Census region
dummies; the coefficient on the RDI remains positive and significant. As seen in Table
2, the RDI similarly positively predicts other aspects of segregation, including isolation,
clustering, concentration, and centralization. The effects of the RDI on three of these
four facets of segregation are highly significant.
9 Regressions that instead use later measures of manufacturing share (1970 and 1998) produce similar
results. These regressions should, if anything, bias the effect of manufacturing on outcomes toward greater
significance (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001).
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Specification checks
Table 3 displays the results of regressions that use railroad division to predict city
characteristics prior to the time when cities experienced significant African-American inflows. I
use data from 1920, which is just after the start of the Migration, but using data from such a late
date should merely bias specification tests toward failure. As shown in Table 3, the RDI predicts
neither 1920 labor force participation, average income, population, physical city size, nor percent
black. The RDI has a marginally significant relationship with literacy rate in an unexpected
direction-more railroad subdivision corresponds to higher literacy.
Main results: The impact of segregation on city outcomes
Table 4 shows ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares estimates of the
effects of racial segregation on a variety of current urban characteristics. Black outcomes
and white outcomes are shown separately. Table 4 also includes overall city outcomes,
but these are strongly driven by white outcomes, since white populations numerically
dominate black populations.
The top panel of Table 4 demonstrates that RDI-induced segregation causes a
city's low-skilled whites to have better characteristics. White unemployment and poverty
are lower, and whites are less likely to be high-school dropouts; the former two effects
are significant. In contrast, RDI-induced segregation causes a city's black population to
have worse characteristics; in particular, they have much higher poverty rates. The
effects of segregation on black unemployment and proportion of adults who are high-
school dropouts, however, are not significant.
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The bottom panel of Table 4 shows that RDI-induced segregation has negative
effects on the characteristics at the upper end of the skill distribution. Segregation
significantly lowers the fractions of a city's blacks and whites who are college graduates,
as well as the fractions of white and black households with more than $150,000 in
income. The negative effects on these characteristics for whites are as large as or larger
than for blacks.
Table 5 shows migration and housing market characteristics by race from 2000 Census
statistics reported at the urban level. Cities with more RDI-induced segregation have
significantly fewer new residents, both black and white. The effect on black in-migration is
larger than the effect for whites.
Unfortunately, because the Census does not supply data on out-migration, I cannot
distinguish between low demand and low supply as explanations for this result. It may be that
there are fewer new residents because out-migration is lower, leading to few vacancies.
However, the evidence on housing values in Table 5 suggests that segregated cities are in fact in
less demand. First, more segregated places have significantly lower rents, lower mortgage costs,
and lower home values. These effects do not appear to be driven by lower cost of living in more
segregated cities, since rents are as low or lower as a fraction of income (significantly lower for
whites). Second, lower expenditures on housing also do not seem to reflect lower consumption
of housing in more segregated cities; blacks and whites in more segregated cities are
significantly less likely to live in crowded homes (that is, homes with more than one person per
room).
VII. The effects of segregation on individual outcomes
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To what extent are these differences in present-day city characteristics driven by
sorting of individuals across cities in response to segregation? To what extent are they
driven by the direct effect of segregation on the production of health, human capital, and
productivity? To distinguish between the effects of segregation on individuals and
equilibrium sorting of individuals by race and skill, it is helpful to briefly examine the
theoretical relationships between tastes, skills, production, and residential choice.
Theory of Skill Production and Endogenous Migration
Assume two small open-economy cities that exist for two generations. City I has
railroad technology such that it will have two perfectly racially integrated tracts, while
city S has railroad technology such that it will have two perfectly racially segregated
tracts (See Figure 4a for an illustration). In all other ways, these two cities are identical.
At time zero, corresponding to the Great Migration, each city is randomly
assigned the same population of measure one, ,8 of which is black and 1- ,/ white.
There are two types of residents, high and low, such that the high types receive wage H,
relative to a low-type wage that is normalized to 1. Even assuming some wage
discrimination, it is appropriate to infer from the data that at time of the Great Migration
the proportion of blacks who are high types, Phb,, is lower than the proportion of whites
who are high types, Ph,,
Production of types in the next generation depends on the type mix of current
neighborhood residents. This implies that type is a neighborhood-level public good. It
could represent education, health, connectedness to a job network, political influence-
anything that varies at the individual level but might depend on the mix of characteristics
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of a neighborhood's elder generation. In particular, consider the following public-good
production function:
PH2 APH I
where a > 0, l is a scaling parameter, and PHI and PH2 are a neighborhood's
proportion high-type in the first and second generations, respectively.
The parameter a reflects the complementarity or substitutability of types in the
production of next-generation type. If a < 1, the production of high-type offspring is
concave in the percent high type in the current generation, meaning that types are
substitutes. If a > 1, the production of high-type offspring is convex in the percent high
type in the current generation, meaning that types are complements. (See Figure 4b for
an illustration.) The complementarity or substitutability of types has important
implications for the economic efficiency of segregation.
If residents cannot move between cities-i.e., moving costs are greater than high-
skilled income-we need go no further. Tastes or distastes for integration will be
irrelevant, the high-skilled will not be able to migrate differently from the low-skilled,
and housing demand will not differ by city. Observed differences in proportion high-
skilled in the second generation can be interpreted as resulting from the relative
productivity of segregation. As long as a > 0, whites in S will have higher PH2 than
whites and blacks in I, who in turn will have higher PH2 than blacks in S. If a > 1, so
that types are complements, then the weighted average PH2 in S will be greater than the
weighted average PH2 in I-implying that segregation is more efficient than integration.
If a < 1, so that types are substitutes, then the weighted average PH2 in S will be smaller
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than the weighted average PH2 in I-implying that integration is more efficient than
segregation.
However, if moving cost C is low enough that migration between cities occurs,
then the picture becomes more complicated. Race, income, tastes or distastes for
integration, intergenerational altruism, and the elasticity of housing supply will affect
individuals' choice of city. To explore these complications, allow a parameter a to
represent taste (if positive) or distaste (if negative) for integration, and assume that
individual utility is:
U = ln(wage) + (a I residenceinI)
Consistent with survey evidence, a varies continuously, takes on both positive and
negative values, and is distributed differently by race. A simple parameterization that
captures these attributes is to define a as distributed uniformly on the interval [a w, d w]
for whites and [a b, 6 b] for blacks.
In the absence of housing discrimination and with a flexible neighborhood
delineation, we can assume that the housing market clears on the city level. Initially, with
equal population of measure 1 in each city, the price of housing in city I relative to city S
can be normalized to 0. To avoid an unrealistic corner solution in which everyone resides
in one city or the other, it is desirable that the relative price of housing in city I approach
infinity as city population approaches 2 and approach negative infinity as city population




where R is the rent that must be paid (or subsidy received) each generation, q is a scaling
parameter, and T is the total population of city I (see Figure 4c for an illustration).
To capture individuals' interests in the difference in public goods production by
segregation and race, assume that each individual is altruistic towards an offspring in the
second generation who shares taste parameter a. The individual's problem, then, is to
maximize, by choosing I or S, the value of his own utility plus the expected value of his
offspring's utility, which is discounted at rate S.
In equilibrium, the proportion of each of the four groups of individuals (high- and
low-type blacks and whites) choosing I should be in the interval (0,1), since we never in
fact observe cities entirely missing one of these demographics. Within race and type,
individuals will sort by preferences, so that the individual with preference a* is
indifferent between the two cities, while those with a>a* choose city I and those with
a<a* choose city S.
Thus we have four indifference equations and four unknowns-the proportions
(bH, WH, bL, and WL) of each group that choose the integrated city-so we can solve for
the equilibrium populations, generation 2 proportion high-type, and rent differential:
b = ln(H -C-R[T+ ln(H-R[T]+ 1 (PhbbH + (1 -l)PhwWH ln(H-R[T])
_+ _PPhbbH +( - )PhwWH ln(l-R[T])-ln(H -C)-Xln(H)
I+a ( 1-bPhb b ( hb-Pb) 
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H =l21n(H - C- R[Tb + Xln(H - R[T)+- I + -)P wH--
+ (1 fpb, +(1- )pw,) Iln(l-R[T])-/ln(H-C)-/ln(H)
I + a (1 WH P h (1 -w )iL=/ i  -CIhw I n(H)+ 2 (-w )
-' Phw-- L W-
bL=V1n1C[b+}f+ 1 pP(hbbH +(- P)PhwH ln(H-R[T])
I~~~~+a TI8 HI (p + (1- )phH Ph)(
WHb)Phw a ln()+ -2+ aWL = Y n(1- C - R[Tb + Xln(l - R[T + l (phbH +n(H - R[T)1 ( (1-wH)Phw ' () 2 + (1- w )1+a l-WHPhw -WL(t -Phw) 1+
Because these equations are of the form xln(x), they do not have closed-form solutions.
Instead, they can be solved numerically for given parameter values.
Without making parametric assumptions necessary to solve the model, several
implications are clear. If, in equilibrium, rents are lower in cities with more exogenous
segregation, then either segregation is unproductive or people on average have strong
tastes for integration. If, in addition, it is observed that in equilibrium a racial group has
more positive outcomes in more segregated cities and faces lower rent in these cities, 
it is
evident that segregation is productive for that group, but that the group has average 
tastes
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in favor of integration. On the other hand, if a group has worse outcomes in more
segregated cities and pays lower rents, it is unclear whether those with lower
unobservable type are sorting into more segregated cities because of the lower costs or
whether the cities actually produce worse outcomes. Finally, the model has a specific
prediction in terms of the relative production effects by race: since blacks start out with a
lower type distribution, segregation must produce relatively worse outcomes for blacks
than for whites. Any effect on white characteristics that is more negative than the
corresponding effect on blacks must be due to sorting.
Extrapolating to an multigenerational context, sorting recurs every generation,
since type is not perfectly inherited. That is, migration persists even in equilibrium, as
offspring who find themselves with different type than their parents re-sort so that the
housing market clears. The signed equilibrium conditions for outcomes, rents, and
migration can be used to make inferences from the patterns that emerge in the empirical
results.
Empirical Estimates of Outcomes by Race and Type
To apply the equilibrium conditions concerning prices and housing demand by
race and skill to the data, segregation is again treated as an endogenous regressor
affecting outcome Y, as in equations (1) and (2). Here, however, these outcomes are city
average housing prices and net population flows for particular demographic groups. I test
whether the population flows of young people of each race or race and skill group are
positive or negative, and also whether the group faces relatively high or low rent and
mortgage costs.
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The difference between the overall change in a city's skill distribution, estimated
earlier, and that explained by migration represents the city's production of skill. For
example, the percent change in a city's population of young high school dropouts,
conditional on net migration of young high school dropouts, can provide an upper bound
for the effect of city production on the size of the low-skill population. A similar
argument holds for college graduates. By breaking down these differences by race, the
race-specific production effects of segregation can be measured, which in turn allows the
testing of the equilibrium conditions derived above.
Aggregate Census data do not allow me to distinguish racial migration patterns by
education level. They also do not report out-migration, which is required to identify net
migration (since population change data combine in- and out-migration with births and
deaths). To identify the out-migration and characteristics of young people by race-skill
group, I use Census microdata (Ruggles et al. 2004) on 22- to 30-year-olds that I
aggregate to the urban level. However, Census microdata only identify a subset of urban
locations, and represent a 5% sample of the population. Both of these limitations reduce
the precision of my estimates.
Table 6 shows migration data by race and education for young adults age 22 to
30. Consistent with the aggregate data in Table 5, individual-level data also show lower
rents in more segregated cities. Unfortunately, the microdata cannot give precise enough
estimates to distinguish total population change from that change induced by net
migration. Therefore, these data cannot separately identify production effects and the
effects of general equilibrium sorting by race and education. I hope to further explore
these separate effects using restricted-use Census microdata in future research.
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Combining these results with the aggregate results derived earlier, low-skilled
whites are better off in more segregated cities: they are less likely to be poor or
unemployed, and they pay lower rent for better housing. Nonetheless, they do not appear
to be migrating towards segregated cities-the estimates of the effects of RDI-induced
segregation on migration of white high-school graduates and dropouts are negative and
insignificant. This suggests that more segregated cities produce better outcomes for low-
skilled whites. The mechanism or mechanisms through which this production occurs
remains an open question.
More segregated cities have a higher percentage of blacks who are poor. Their
white and black populations have fewer college graduates and fewer households with
very high income. The data cannot distinguish with certainty between sorting and
production explanations for these groups. However, the fact that the quasi-experimental
estimates for high-skilled white education and income are as large as or larger in
magnitude than those for high-skilled blacks suggest, according to the model, that at least
some of the white effect is due to migration.
VIII. Discussion
To what extent does racial segregation cause worse city level outcomes? This
question has been difficult to answer because of the confounding effects of endogenous
segregation and endogenous migration. This paper addresses the first of these two
obstacles: it separates endogenous relationships between segregation and city
characteristics (such as their correlations with more manufacturing and larger black
population) from relationships induced by quasi-experimental variation, and
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demonstrates thatRDI-induced segregation causes cities to have low-skilled whites with
better characteristics and other populations with worse characteristics. It also sheds light
on the second concern: it identifies the effects of segregation on low-skilled whites as
results of differential production rather than migration; it suggests that at least some of
the effects on high-skilled white characteristics occur through migration.
OLS estimates overstate the negative effects of segregation on low-skilled whites
and blacks and overstate the positive effects on high-skilled whites. This suggests that
other city characteristics that result in greater inequality also imply more endogenous
segregation. Such a correlation could arise, for example, if cities that have lower tastes
for redistribution also have lower tastes for neighborhood mixing. It does, however,
appear that on average Americans have tastes for more integrated cities-such cities are
more crowded, demand higher rents, and attract more new residents.
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Figure 1.
Binghamton, NY York, PA
19th century railroads, shown in red within the 4-kilometer radius historical city center,
divide York, PA into a larger number of smaller neighborhoods than do the railroads in
Binghamton, NY. Thus, even though the two cities had similar total lengths of track,
similar World War II labor shortages, and similar manufacturing bases (in fact,
Binghamton was somewhat more industrial than York), York became more segregated,
as can be seen from the smaller, more concentrated area of African-Americans near the
railroad-defined neighborhoods at the city's center. Rivers are shown in blue.
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Figure 2. Measuring the railroads of Anaheim, CA
Figure 2a. 1894 15' map showing Anaheim, CA, which is marked in green.
Figure 2b. The outline of the densely occupied area of Anaheim, defined as dense
housing (each house is represented by a dot) and regular streets. The centroid of the
occupied area is marked in blue.
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Figure 2c. The historical city center is defined as the 4 kilometer-radius circle around the
centroid of the historical city, and is shown here in red.
Figure 2d. Every railroad within the 4-kilometer circle is marked and measured-detail
is shown here in violet.
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Figure 2e. Neighborhoods are defined as polygons created by the intersection of
railroads with each other and with the perimeter. Anaheim contains five neighborhoods,
shown here in orange. The area of each neighborhood is calculated and used to calculate
a RDI measuring the subdivision of the historical city center.
Figure 2f. Year 2000 census tracts are shown in green. Note that current neighborhood
borders, as defined by the US Census Bureau in 2000, closely follow historical railroad
tracks.
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Figure 4. Illustrations for model
:IT
S
Figure 4a. City I is perfectly integrated (blacks and whites have the same outcomes,
determined by the overall city characteristics ). City S is perfectly segregated (blacks and
whites have different outcomes, determined only by the characteristics of those of their








Figure 4b. The convexity of the skill production function with regard to proportion
high-skilled in the current generation will determine whether the separating (segregation)
or pooling (integration) outcome is more efficient in producing second generation skill.
Note, however, that the proportion of high-skill in the next generation is always
increasing with the current proportion of skill, so that it is always desirable for an
individual to be in a higher-skilled neighborhood. In the absence of perfect markets,
then, low-skilled people may be unable to fully compensate high-skilled people to live
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Figure 4c. A basic rent function. Note that the parameter tI will determine for what
range of populations rent will rise less than population (housing supply is elastic) and at
what threshold level rent will begin rising faster (housing supply is inelastic). A smaller











Table 1. First stage: Railroad division index as a predictor of current segregation
(dissimilarity index)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Railroad division index
track length (km/km2)
























R-squared 0.21 0.28 0.37
X
0.42
Standard errors in parentheses. N=134.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 2. First stage with Alternative Segregation Measures: Railroad subdivision index as a
predictor of current segregation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Dissimilarity Isolation Clustering Concentration Centralization
variable:
Railroad division 0.3407** 0.3596** 0.4299** 0.3875* 0.2335
index
(0.0825) (0.1046) (0.1345) (0.1529) (0.1414)
Observations 134 134 121 121 121
R-squared 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.16 0.05
All regressions control for total track length per square kilometer and per-capita WWII war contracts.
Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 3. Falsification Tests: 1920 Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Labor Force Average Literacy Population Area (mi2) Percent
Participation Income Rate Black
Rate Category
Railroad division 0.0403 -0.0887 0.0429+ 312,242 1,036 -0.0029
index
(0.0279) (0.1329) (0.0241) (305,958) (27,741) (0.032)
Observations 134 134 134 78 72 49
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.49
All regressions control for total track length per square kilometer and per-capita WWII war contracts.
Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4. The Effect of Segregation on Current City Characteristics
Overall Blacks Whites
Dependent variable OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
A. Lower-tail characteristics
Poverty rate -0.0165 -0.1711+ 0.2291** 0.3573* -0.0497* -0.1721*
(0.0287) (0.0930) (0.0511) (0.1536) (0.0217) (0.0711)
Unemployment rate 0.0028 -0.0794+ 0.1119** 0.0222 -0.0105 -0.0657+
(0.0142) (0.0467) (0.0270) (0.0824) (0.0105) (0.0338)
Fraction of adults who are
high school dropouts 0.0480 -0.1751 0.3436** 0.0971 0.0602 -0.0701
(0.0475) (0.1509) (0.0546) (0.1724) (0.0404) (0.1232)
B. Upper-tail characteristics
Fraction of adults who are -0.1956** -0.3303+ -0.3352** -0.4035** -0.1695* -0.4614*
college graduates
(0.0557) (0.1670) (0.0440) (0.1302) (0.0619) (0.1967)
Fraction of households with -0.0341* -0.0960+ -0.0311** -0.0496+ -0.0277 -0.1347*
more than $150,000 in
income
(0.0169) (0.0521) (0.0085) (0.0255) (0.0210) (0.0675)
All regressions control for total track length per square kilometer and per-capita WWII war contracts.
Standard errors in parentheses. N=134. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 5. Effect of segregation on migration and housing by race, from aggregate Census data
Outcome variable
Proportion of residents who are





Median percent of income that
goes to rent
Proportion of HHs w/more than 1
person per room
-412.6272** -770.3659** -348.2157** -847.8479**

































All regressions control for total track length per square kilometer and per-capita WWII war contracts.



































































































































































































The Effect of Marital Breakup on the Income and Poverty





Having a female firstborn child significantly increases the probability that a woman's
first marriage breaks up. We exploit this exogenous variation to measure the effect of marital
breakup on women's economic outcomes. We find evidence that divorce has little effect on a
woman's average household income, but significantly increases the probability that her
household will be in the lowest income quartile. While women partially offset the loss of
spousal earnings with child support, welfare, combining households, and substantially increasing
their labor supply, divorce significantly increases the odds of household poverty on net.
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Introduction and Motivation
The poverty rate for single mothers fell substantially between 1974 and 2002. Over the
same period, the poverty rate for married mothers remained virtually unchanged. Given these
facts, one might assume that women with children are less likely to be poor than they were 30
years ago. In fact, however, the overall poverty rate for women with children rose slightly over
this period (Figure 1).
A clue to resolving this puzzle may be found in the fact that divorce and single
parenthood have been increasing dramatically over the past several decades throughout the
developed world. In the United States, the proportion of mothers who are single rose from about
16 percent in 1974 to roughly 26 percent in 2002 (Figure 2). It appears that in the absence of this
trend, overall poverty rates would have decreased, rather than increased.
In order to establish this argument, however, one would need to demonstrate a causal
relationship between divorce and poverty. Current political discussions commonly assume that
marriage has causal beneficial effects on women and children. In particular, recent welfare
legislation encourages marriage as a method of increasing income and reducing the need or
eligibility for welfare. President Bush's 2005 budget proposal earmarks $1.2 billion of its
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF, or welfare) budget for a five-year initiative
"supporting healthy marriages"'°; five states allocate some of their general TANF budget to
marriage promotion activities, and ten states provide cash marriage incentives in the structure of
their TANF benefits".
10 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "FY2005 Budget in Brief."
http://www.hhs.gov/budget/05budget/acf.html
11 Gardiner, Karen, Michael Fishman, Plamen Nikolov, Asaph Glosser, and Stephanie Laud.
"State Policies to Promote Marriage: Final Report." U.S. Department of Health and Human
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Despite the assumptions made in popular debate, a causal relationship between economic well-
being and marriage preservation has not been established. Indeed, there are reasons to suspect that the
correlation between marital breakup and poverty overstates the causal effect of divorce. For example,
negative household income shocks such as job loss or falling real wages may increase marital tension
and thereby increase the likelihood of divorce, so that poverty causes divorce rather than divorce driving
poverty. In addition, women with worse earnings opportunities may be less attractive marriage partners,
which would mean that women who get divorced have lower income, but not simply because they got
divorced. Of course, the possibility also exists that the causal relation is understated.
This paper uses an instrumental variables (IV) approach to separate the causal effects of
divorce from its well-known correlations. Using the 1980 U.S. Census, we document that having
a female first-born child slightly, but robustly, increases the probability that a woman's first
marriage breaks up. We find that the likelihood that a woman's first marriage is broken is 0.63
percentage points higher if her first child is a girl, representing a 3.7 percent increase from a base
likelihood of 17.2 percentage points. This result, which we will argue implies that sons have a
stabilizing effect on the family unit, is consistent with the finding (established in the psychology
and sociology literature) that fathers bond more with sons.
When we use child sex as an instrumental variable to measure the effect of divorce on
economic outcomes, we find that the marital breakup driven by having a girl does not
significantly affect mean household income. Marital breakup does, however, significantly affect
the household income distribution; in particular, it dramatically increases the probability that a
mother will end up with very low income. While child support, welfare, and an increase in her
Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2002.
http://aspe.hhs. gov/hsp/marriageO2f/report.htm
51
own earnings (due to a substantially increased labor supply) go some way towards alleviating the
loss of her husband's earnings, they often do not prevent poverty status. We also find some
evidence that women who divorce may be slightly more likely to end up at the top of the income
distribution, possibly due to re-marriage.
Several concerns might reasonably be raised about causal interpretation of the
relationships between child sex, marital breakup, and economic outcomes. First, one might be
concerned that the observed relationship between child sex and divorce is in fact an artifact of
differential custody rates; women are more likely to lose custody of their boys in divorce, leading
to divorced women being observed with fewer boys. However, we find highly comparable
estimates in Current Population Survey (CPS) supplements that provide detailed fertility
histories, which lends evidence that our results are not due to bias in observed household
composition. Second, biologists (Trivers and Willard 1973) argue that child sex is endogenous
to resources-that is, that natural selection has favored the ability of parents to have more girls in
bad economic times. We find, however, that in our sample there is no difference between the
economic resources of mothers of boys and mothers of girls when their first child is born; rather,
the difference in income builds up over time, as does the difference in divorce rates. Third, one
might worry that sex of the first-born child affects economic outcomes through channels other
than divorce. For example, parents may work harder when they have a son. But we find a
negligible effect of child sex on economic outcomes in a sample of women with a low exogenous
probability of divorce, which provides evidence that child sex is not affecting economic
outcomes through a channel other than marital breakup.
After discussing our findings, we consider the potential macro implications of the
relationship we identify between divorce and poverty. In recent decades, mothers' poverty rates
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have failed to decline as much as the overall rate. Can the increase in the proportion of divorced
women in the U.S. explain this stagnation? We calculate that, in fact, the poverty rate of women
with children today is substantially higher than it would be if divorce had not risen over the post-
1980 period.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we set our findings in the context of
previous research. In section 3, we describe the data and the sample we use. In section 4, we
describe the estimation strategy for analyzing mean outcomes and describe the results. In section
5, we develop a framework for estimating distributional outcomes and discuss the results. In
section 6, we conclude.
Divorce and Children's Gender
Previous research has established the need for instrumental variables when examining the
effect of marital status on women's outcomes, both in theory (e.g. Becker, Landes, and Michael
1977; Becker 1985) and empirically (e.g. Angrist and Evans 1998). In particular, Gruber (2000)
emphasizes the necessity of alternatives to cross-sectional analysis when measuring the effect of
divorce on child outcomes.
We instrument for the breakup of a woman's first marriage using the sex of the first-born child.
Having a first-born girl could be positively correlated with breakup of the first marriage for one or more
reasons involving both the husband and the wife. First, a man with a daughter may be less interested in
sustaining marriage than a man with a son. He may intrinsically value a son more, perceiving him as an
"heir." Or he may have more in common with a boy than with a girl, and therefore bond better over
time. Second, a woman with a daughter may be less interested in sustaining marriage than a woman
with a son. For example, she may believe a son needs his father as a role model, and therefore work
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harder to retain her husband. Or she may get better companionship from a daughter, and therefore place
less weight on her relationship with her husband.
The previous literature supports the idea that fathers tend to bond more with their sons. Aldous,
Mulligan and Bjarnason (1998), using data from the U.S. National Surveys of Families and Households,
find that fathers spend more time with boys than with girls, and that the gender gap in paternal attention
increases as the child ages. This supports the idea of increased bonding over time. Harris, Furstenberg
and Marmer (1998) construct a "parental involvement index" and find that fathers' involvement with
their adolescent children is higher with sons than with daughters, while mothers' involvement does not
differ by child sex. This supports the claim that fathers bond more with sons, but does not lend evidence
that mothers get better companionship from daughters. Thus the literature is more consistent with the
theory that fathers bond more with sons, and that this has a stabilizing effect on the family unit.
Previous work (e.g. Angrist and Evans 1998) considers child sex as an exogenous variable when
analyzing U.S. data and after conditioning on race. This seems particularly plausible when considering
only births that took place prior to the 1980's, when ultrasound was limited to problematic pregnancies
(Campbell 2000). Nevertheless, concern has been raised by some that child sex is endogenous to
resource levels. Trivers and Willard (1973) argue that a male is likely to out-reproduce a female if both
are in good condition, and vice versa if both are in bad condition. They argue that natural selection may
therefore have favored parental ability to adjust sex ratios so that more girls are born in bad times, and
they argue that data from mammals support their hypothesis. Our findings, however, are not consistent
with the Trivers and Willard hypothesis. We find no relationship between economic circumstances at
birth and child sex. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the sex of the eldest child is
exogenous.
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Dahl and Moretti (2004), in simultaneous research, examine the relationship between
child sex and divorce-that is, our first stage. They too find a significant relationship between
having female children and divorce, although our estimates of the effect size are smaller because
we address serious selection problems that otherwise overstate the relationship.
In related research, Bedard and Deschenes (2003) use the same instrumental variable for
divorce: gender of the first child. When we use specifications similar to theirs, our results are
generally consistent with their findings: they, like we, find that divorce has no significant
negative causal effect on women's mean economic outcomes and that the cross-sectional
relationship between divorce and household income at the mean is due to selection.
However, when we look beyond the mean to consider the way in which marital breakup affects
the entire income distribution of women with children, we arrive at a different conclusion. Namely, we
find that marital breakup has significant negative consequences for many women; in particular, it
increases the probability that a woman lives in poverty.
We also find some evidence that women who remarry may actually become "better off'
in terms of income after the end of their first marriages. This is consistent with an earlier
literature that does not attempt to establish causality or deal with selection into remarriage:
Mueller and Pope (1980) and Jacobs and Furstenberg (1986) find that women who remarry do
better in terms of their husbands' education level and SES score. Duncan and Hoffman (1985)
find that five years after their divorce, women who remarried gained in terms of family income.
12
12 Both Jacobs and Furstenberg and Duncan and Hoffman argue that this is largely due to life
cycle effects, so that if the man these women divorced is similar to the average person in his age
group, he would have made similar gains from the time of his divorce until the time we observe
the woman's second husband. We suspect, however, that in our case the men who divorce are
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Previous literature has not emphasized the relationship between divorce and inequality,
although both have increased substantially over the past three decades. Much of the recent
literature on the causes of inequality has focused on wage inequality and the forces that may be
affecting it, such as: technology (Acemoglu 2002); the decline of labor market institutions
(DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996); and the rise of international trade. Our findings suggest
that the decline of the traditional family unit as an institution may have contributed to the rise in
income inequality.
Data
We use data on women living with minor children from the 5 percent 1980 Census file,
which allow us sufficient power to identify the effect of sex of the first-born child on marital
breakup.' 3 We limit our sample to white women who are living with all of their children, whose
eldest child is under 17, who had their first birth after marriage, after age 18 and before age 45,
and had a single first birth. These limitations are necessary in order to create a sample for which
measurement error in the sex of the observed first-born child has a classical structure. In
particular it is important to consider only women who live with all their children, since by doing
so we avoid any spurious correlation between child sex and household structure due to
differential maternal custody rates of boys and girls. For further discussion of the sample
construction, see the Appendix.
negatively selected, so it is plausible that women who re-married did somewhat improve their
economic situation.
13 While earlier censuses have these measures, in previous decades the divorce rate was very
low. Subsequent censuses, on the other hand, don't have all of the necessary measures. We did,
however, try similar specifications using 1990 data and found similar patterns to those reported
here; this finding lends evidence that cohort-specific effects are not driving the relationship
between firstborn sex and divorce.
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Table 1 shows summary statistics for our full sample and subsamples relative to the
overall population of women with minor children. Our sample is quite similar to the overall
population except in terms of age and marital status. Our sample is younger than average,
consistent with the requirement that a woman's eldest child is under 17. The women in our
sample are slightly less likely to be divorced, both because they are younger and because we
require that they have custody of all children. And of course, unlike the overall population,
women in our sample cannot be never-married. On other characteristics, however, the two
groups differ little: women in our sample have slightly more education and household income
than the overall population and work and earn slightly less.
In addition to estimating our model on the full sample, we look specifically at two
subsamples that we use in specification checks: those who are at high risk of having ever
divorced and those at low risk of having ever divorced. We create an index of exogenous risk
for divorce, which is orthogonal to the sex of the eldest child (see Appendix). The high-risk
subsample includes women whose predicted risk is in the top quartile; the low-risk subsample
includes women whose predicted risk is in the bottom quartile.
The high-predicted divorce subsample is much older on average than the low-predicted
divorce subsample, consistent with more years of exposure to risk of divorce. They are also less
educated, but they have higher own and household income-probably due to lifecycle effects.
The two subsamples allow us to test the validity of our IV strategy. As Table 1 shows,
women in the high-predicted divorce subsample are much more likely to have undergone divorce
by the time we observe them, so if the responsiveness to the child-sex instrument is proportional
to the overall level of divorce then we would expect the first stage to be bigger for this group.
Moreover, the high predicted-divorce subsample has lower years of schooling and thus may be,
57
on average, of lower SES; below, we conjecture that our instrument may play a larger role in
marital breakup decisions for this group. Thus we expect the first stage to be stronger for the
high-divorce subsample than for the low-divorce subsample. As a consequence, the two-stage
effect of child sex on outcomes should also be more precise for the high-divorce subsample, if
indeed our IV strategy is valid and child sex is affecting outcomes through divorce rather than
through other channels.
Estimation of the Effect of Marital Breakup on Average Economic Outcomes
Estimation Framework
We begin our investigation of the causal effects of divorce by considering a simple econometric
model. In this model, income is affected by the breakup of the first marriage, which is treated as a
classic endogenous regressor:
(1) D = aZ + X 2 + Ua3 + u
(2) Y = AD + X 2+ U 3 + 
The right-hand-side variable of interest in equation (2), D, is a dummy for the breakup of
the first marriage. We define a woman as having her first marriage intact if she reported both
that she was "currently married with spouse present" and that she had been married exactly once.
We define as having her first marriage broken any woman who: has been married multiple times,
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is married but currently not living with her husband, is currently separated from her husband, is
currently divorced, or is currently widowed. 14
Our outcomes, Y, are total others' income, defined as total household income less total
own income; household income; a measure of household poverty; and in some specifications
hours worked last year. The change in others' income measures the direct effect on a woman of
losing her husband as a source of income (to the extent that the husband is not replaced by other
wage earners). The change in total household income captures this direct effect but also includes
the indirect effects of divorce on income: transfers from the ex-husband in the form of alimony
and child support1 5; transfers from the state in the form of cash assistance; and income generated
by the woman's own labor supply response. 16
Our controls, denoted by X, are a vector of pre-determined demographic variables including
age, age squared, age at first birth and a dummy for high-school dropouts. 17 While our Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimates of the relationship between marital breakup and income may be sensitive to
14 We have run the analysis with ever-divorced, rather than first marriage broken, as the
explanatory variable: in this case, widows and those separated from or not living with their first
husband are coded as 0 rather than 1. Our results are not sensitive to this difference in
categorization.
It is not possible to systematically remove widows from the sample, since the data do not allow
us to identify those whose first marriage ended in death among those who have had multiple
marriages. In any event, since widowhood is endogenous to both socioeconomic status and
marital duration, it is probably not desirable to exclude widows.
15 The 1980 Census question reads: "Unemployment compensation, veterans' payments,
pensions, alimony or child support, or any other sources of income received regularly... Exclude
lump-sum payments such as money from an inheritance or the sale of a home."
16 We have also looked at various intermediate outcomes, such as the level of alimony and child
support, the level of welfare, the woman's own earnings, and the woman's hours. All of the
analyses gave results highly consistent with the results presented here, and are available from the
authors upon request.
17 Since we look only at women who gave birth to their first child after age 19, we can
reasonably assume that the decision on whether to graduate from high school is made prior to the
realization of the sex of the first-born child.
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their inclusion, our IV specifications are robust to controls (results without controls are available upon
request). We think of U as representing unobserved factors such as human capital, views on gender
roles, and taste for non-market work relative to market work and leisure. Finally, our instrumental
variable, Z, is an indicator for having a girl as one's firstborn child.
As discussed above, there are two major problems with estimating equation (2) with OLS. The
first, correlation of U and D, can be seen as omitted variables bias or a selection problem, and it induces
a bias of indeterminate direction. Women with worse earnings opportunities may be less attractive
marriage partners: this would imply negative selection into marital breakup and upward bias in the
estimated cost of marital breakup for women. On the other hand, women with worse earnings
opportunities may be more interested in sustaining marriage. Or a stronger preference for household
work relative to market work may cause a woman to work harder at staying married. In this case, the
women who stay married would have supplied fewer hours of labor had their marriage broken up, and
their earnings would have been lower.
The second major problem with OLS estimates of equation (2) is reverse causality.
Conditional on a woman's observed and unobserved characteristics, a negative income shock to
the household may increase marital tension and thereby raise the likelihood of divorce.
To address concerns both about omitted variable bias and about reverse causality, we
estimate equation (2) using two-stage least squares, using the sex of the eldest child (Z ) as an
instrument for whether the first marriage is broken (D). Angrist and Imbens (1994) show that in
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the absence of covariates and given the standard two-stage least squares assumptions,1 8 the IV
approach identifies the local average treatment effect:
(3) fl]., = Cov(D,Y) = E[Y I Z = 1] - E[Y Z = ] E[ -Y ID > D]
Var(D) E[D I Z = 1]- E[D I Z = 0]
Here Y. and Y0 denote the income (or other dependent variable) for women whose first
marriage is broken and intact, respectively. D is an indicator for whether a woman would
divorce if her first child were a girl; Do is an indicator for whether she would divorce if her first
child were a boy. D and Do are, of course, just hypothetical constructs; in practice we can only
observe the indicator for the child sex that is realized.
filv therefore measures the change in income due to divorce for women whose first
marriage breaks up if they have a girl and remains intact if they have a boy. That is, two-stage
least squares estimates the average effect of divorce only for that part of the population for whom
the treatment is equal to the instrument ( D, > Do), the group known as "compliers." As one
might imagine, this group is typically not a random subsample of the population, and in fact we
will show below that those who comply with sex of the first-born child tend to be of low socio-
economic status (SES).' 9
18 The assumptions are: conditional independence of Z, exclusion of the instrument, existence of
a first stage and monotonicity - see Abadie (2002). The result can be generalized for the case
with covariates.
19 Note that AeIv can only be interpreted as the causal effect of divorce for the average complier
to the extent that the sample is not contaminated with "defiers". Defiers are women for whom
Do > Di, that is, women whose first marriage would dissolve only if their firstborn is a boy. We
have run first-stage regressions for a variety of sub-populations and found no significant sign
reversals in the coefficient of child sex on divorce, suggesting that defiers, if any, are a very
small group.
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First Stage Results: Child Sex and Marital Breakup
The first stage results for the entire population as well as for the full sample and various
subsamples are presented in Table 2. When equation (1) is estimated for all women living with minor
children, the coefficient on child sex is 1.13 percent. We believe that this figure overstates the actual
effect of child sex on marital breakup, because endogeneity in the sex of the eldest child residing with a
woman will create a spurious correlation between living with an eldest girl and being divorced.2 0 That
is, since women are more likely to end up with custody of girls than boys in the event of divorce, living
with a girl is cross-sectionally correlated with being divorced above and beyond the causal effect of
having a girl on marital breakup.
The second column gives the estimated relationship for our sample, which is constructed in order
to close the custody channel, so that the relationship between child sex and marital breakup is causal.
We find that the average effect of the first child being a girl on the breakup of the first marriage is about
0.63 percent, which is substantially smaller than the full-population estimate, but still highly significant.
Furthermore, as discussed below, we replicate our result using data from the Current Population Survey,
which identifies the sex of a woman's actual firstborn child (and hence requires no sample restrictions).
The CPS results are highly similar to those from our Census sample.
The effect increases with the age of the eldest child, suggesting, sensibly, that the sex of the first
child affects the hazard rate of divorce and separation.21 This can also be seen in Figures 3 and 4, each
presenting the results from 17 separate regressions by the age (0 to 16) of the eldest child. We also find
20 In fact, a regression similar to those in Table 2 for a sample of women with all of our
restrictions except that she must reside with all of her children gives an estimate of .010. This
result is much closer to the estimate in column 1 than in column 2, suggesting that the factor
driving the difference between the estimates in the full population and in our sample is the
endogeneity of child residence.
21 The base hazard rate of divorce may also change with the length of the relationship, which is
correlated with the age of the eldest child.
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that the effect size varies by the woman's education-high-school dropouts exhibit the strongest effect,
and the effect size diminishes as education increases. This suggests that our instrument primarily
provides us insight on the effects of marital breakup particularly for low-SES women.
Finally, we find a larger and more significant effect on those at higher exogenous risk of
divorce: the quarter of our sample with the highest predicted risk of divorce has a first stage of
1.13 percent (highly significant), and the group that is least likely to divorce has a first stage of
0.36 percent (marginally significant). The differential effect by underlying probability of divorce
lends evidence that the instrument is acting in the way we would anticipate.
One further implication of the figures should also be noted: a comparison between
Figures 3 and 4 reveals that the effects of sex of the eldest child on the breakup of the first
marriage are bigger than those on being currently divorced. Much of this difference comes from
the fact that some of the women who divorced due to the instrument have since remarried. In
addition, some of those who have not re-married have instead moved in with other adults (such
as their parents). We find that having an eldest girl increases the probability that a woman is the
head of household by only about half as much as the increase in probability that her first
marriage is broken (result not shown).2 2 It is therefore important to keep in mind that we are not
estimating the effect of being currently divorced or of residing in a mother-only household on
economic outcomes. Rather, we are estimating the effect of having ever been divorced on current
outcomes.
22 Note that this will not capture all avenues of combining households, since a woman may share
a household and be identified as its head.
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Specification Checks
While the lack of over-identification implies that we cannot formally test the validity of our
instrument, we do bring to bear some evidence that the instrument is not correlated with other omitted
variables. First, we test the Trivers and Willard hypothesis that adverse conditions cause women to give
birth to a higher proportion of girls. We have examined the income of mothers who were never married,
and found that the income distribution in this group was very similar whether the eldest was a girl or a
boy. We have also examined the income of women who were married when their first child was born
and whose first marriage was still intact, and similarly found that the income distribution in this group
was virtually the same whether the eldest was a girl or a boy. (Results not shown.)
This is still not a conclusive refutation of the endogenous sex hypothesis for our sample: the first
group, those who were never married, are not included in our sample (we limit to those whose first birth
occurred after their first marriage); the second group includes women who remain married after having a
girl (i.e. those who do not respond to our instrument, and thus for whom we cannot measure the causal
effect of divorce). But we have also found that the reduced-form effect of the instrument on household
income and on others' income is small and statistically insignificant shortly after the child is born.
Rather, the effect of the instrument increases with time.23 This suggests that child sex is not the result of
resources, but rather that later resources are the result of child sex, through its effect on marital
breakup-note that the effect of sex on breakup similarly builds over time (see Figures 3 and 4).
If child sex is not the result of resources, we can interpret as causal the reduced-form
relationship between having an eldest girl and economic outcomes. But child sex may affect
outcomes through paths other than divorce, so that our IV estimate of the effect of divorce on
23 We also regressed the sex of the eldest child on household income and controls for mothers
whose children were aged 0-1 and found no significant effect of household income on child sex.
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outcomes is misstated. There are various possible reasons why either or both parents might work
more or less in response to the sex of the eldest child.24 We again cannot refute these
possibilities directly. However, when we looked at the sample of women whose marriages
remain intact, the income distribution and labor supply of mothers did not substantially differ by
the sex of the eldest child. Similarly, if child sex affects economic outcomes through channels
other than marital breakup, we would expect differences in outcomes by firstborn sex for the
group that is predicted to have a low divorce rate. But we do not find any significant effects for
this subsample.
We might also overestimate the cost of divorce if fathers pay differential child support by
the sex of the eldest child. It is possible that fathers of boys transfer more money to the mother
of their child, even if they are no longer married to her. In this case, again, having a girl would
be negatively correlated with women's outcomes, but not solely through marital breakup. To
check this possibility, we examined the Census "other income" variable (which includes child
support and alimony) for women who are currently divorced and for women who are ever
divorced. We found that other income did not differ by the sex of the eldest child (results not
shown).2 5
24 For example, parents may work harder in the labor market when they have a boy. Lundberg
and Rose (2002) find that men's labor supply and wage rates increase more in response to the
births of sons than to the births of daughters. In addition, having a girl may, even in the absence
of divorce, cause increased marital conflict, which could in turn negatively impact economic
outcomes. In either case, having a girl would be negatively correlated with women's outcomes,
but not solely through marital breakup, and using it as an instrument would cause an
overstatement of the cost of divorce. Alternatively, women may increase their labor supply as a
"defensive investment" in anticipation that their marriage may be less stable (Weiss 1997) if
their first child is a girl.
25 Dahl and Moretti (2003) find that divorced mothers of multiple children who are all girls are
marginally significantly less likely to receive child support than those whose children are all
boys. They, however, use a much less restricted sample, and use the gender of all children.
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A final caveat remains for using the sex of the eldest child as an instrument for marital
breakup: having a son as one's eldest child may affect the likelihood of re-marriage after the first
marriage was broken. Note, again, that this would not invalidate the causal interpretation of the
reduced-form estimates, but could cause us to overstate the direct effects of divorce. Again, we
cannot rule out the existence of such a causal effect. However, when we regress a dummy for
being currently married on having an eldest girl for ever-divorced women in our sample, the
coefficient is indeed negative, but is not statistically significant (t-statistic=0.67).
As an additional check on the validity of the relationship between child sex and marital
breakup, we replicate our Census estimates using CPS data. We do so to address potential
concern about the reliability of our Census sample-that despite our best effort to restrict our
sample to women for whom error in observed eldest child sex is uncorrelated with marital status,
some error remains and is contaminating our estimate. We address this concern by using CPS
fertility supplements. Because they record a woman's fertility history regardless of whether her
children are still in the household, we do not have to worry about bias in the sex of the children
still in the household.
Four June CPS supplements (1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995) record the sex of a woman's
first-born child. In this sample, we need only restrict to women who are white, had their first
birth after their first marriage, and had a single first birth-we need not make any of the Census
restrictions that were geared towards assuring that we accurately observe the sex of the first
child.26 When we pool these supplements (N=107,519), we again find that having an eldest girl
Even within their sample and methodology, when they examine all family sizes they do not find
a significant effect.
26 Compared to the census data, the CPS has drawbacks as well as advantages. On the one hand,
the CPS allows us to look at older women, whose eldest children left their house after their full
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significantly increases the probability of marital breakup. In fact, we find that having an eldest
girl causes a 0.68 percent increase in the probability that the first marriage breaks up (t-
statistic=2.31). We consider the similarity of the point estimates from both samples (the Census
estimate is 0.63 percent) an encouraging sign that our results reflect a real and significant effect
of the sex of the first child on the probability of marital breakup.
The effect of marital breakup on mean outcomes
Cross-sectional (OLS) regressions of income and labor supply on marital breakup (Table
3), which admit no causal interpretation, show that breakup of the first marriage is correlated
with large losses in income and large increases in labor supply. Both of these relationships
confirm the conventional view that women whose first marriages end are significantly worse off
than women whose first marriages remain intact.
Two-stage least squares estimates, on the other hand, suggest that the mean effect of
marital breakup on material well-being is quite different from the cross-sectional results. The
two-stage estimate of the effect of divorce on others' income is negative but insignificant, though
still within two standard deviations of the OLS estimates, as is the two-stage estimate for log
household income.
The two-stage estimate of the effect of divorce on household income level, however, is
significantly more positive than the OLS estimate-while the coefficient is not statistically
different from zero, it is more than two standard deviations from the negative OLS estimate. The
impact on marital stability had been realized, thus increasing the potential causal effect. On the
other hand, older women are less likely to have experienced divorce (due to cohort effects) and
widowhood may be higher, attenuating the estimated effect of child sex on marital breakup.
Finally, in order to get a large enough sample, we needed to look at more recent data, since the
CPS recorded women's fertility history only in the four samples we used.
67
same is true for the high predicted-divorce subsample. For the low predicted-divorce subsample
our first stage is barely significant, so the two-stage least squares estimate cannot rule out zero
effect or an effect equal to the cross-sectional effect. (The absence of significant estimates for
the low predicted divorce subsample in all of our IV specifications is consistent with the fact that
the first stage is only marginally significant for this group, supporting our hypothesis that child
sex affects outcomes only through divorce).
Taken together, these results imply that on average there is negative selection into
divorce-women who would have had low income anyway are more likely to divorce, creating a
negative cross-sectional correlation between income and divorce-and that there is no significant
causal effect of divorce on mean income. The lack of significant effect on others' income is
probably due to the fact that most women compensate for the loss of their husbands' income by
re-marriage or by moving in with other adults. Moreover, we find a very large increase in mean
hours worked (about 1,000 hours a year), which is more than double the cross-sectional effect
and clearly helps offset the loss of husband income in the measure of household income.2 7
As the labor supply results indicate, the stability of mean income should not be taken to
imply that there is no mean welfare loss from divorce. The increase in work without a
significant increase in income could imply a welfare loss for women, since they experience a
mean decrease in leisure without an expansion of consumption possibilities. In addition, it may
imply adverse consequences for children; for example, if parents are not perfectly altruistic they
may divorce even if doing so disrupts joint household production, including childrearing. Our
27 Our results thus far are broadly consistent with those of Bedard and Deschenes (2003), despite
our use of different sample restrictions and specifications, lending further evidence of the
robustness of the relationships we analyze.
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results indicate that on average children receive no gain in consumption but likely experience a
decrease in time with their mother (and probably with their father as well).
Estimation of the Effect of Marital Breakup on the Income Distribution
Estimation Framework
The difference in sign between the IV estimates of the effect of divorce on mean log
income and on mean level of income leads us to investigate the possibility that there are
important effects of marital breakup on the income distribution, particularly at the bottom, that
aren't evident at the mean. In fact, it makes intuitive sense that the effect of divorce on the
income distribution would be to fatten the lower tail, rather than to shift the entire distribution
uniformly downward. After all, divorce-and the implied withdrawal of the husband's
income-represents a discrete fall in income. To the extent that women remarry, move in with
other relatives, or have high earning potential, many may end up as well off financially as before
(or even better off)-resulting in little effect of divorce on the mean of the distribution. And yet
a subset of women who cannot recover from the loss would experience a much greater than
average effect of divorce, falling near the bottom of the distribution.
To address this possibility, we consider more flexible specifications in which we estimate
the effect of marital breakup on the probability that a woman's income is below various
thresholds. This enables us to identify the marginal effect of marital breakup on the cumulative
distribution function (CDF). In addition, we obtain estimators of the CDF itself for those whose
first marriage is broken and for those whose first marriage is intact. Doing so allows us to
evaluate the magnitude of the effect of divorce on the income distribution.
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Recall that the local average treatment effect formula in equation (3) gave the causal effect of
treatment on the compliers. Similarly, Abadie (2002, 2003) demonstrates that in absence of covariates
and with the same assumptions as the standard two-stage least squares model:28
E[(1 - D)Y I Z = 1] - E[(1 - D)Y I Z = 0]
E[(1 - D) I Z = 1]- E[(1- D) I Z = 0]
We can similarly estimate the following equation using two-stage least squares with controls,
using the sex of the eldest child as an instrument:
(5) (1- D)Y = y( - D) + X + u
This strategy gives a consistent estimator:
(6) 'v - ry= E[Y I X;D > Do]
That is, y gives the expected value of Y for compliers who have a boy (and whose marriage
therefore remains intact). When we apply this method to the case where Y is the CDF of the income
distribution we can effectively trace out the CDF for compliers who have boys. Similarly, we could
estimate the CDF for compliers who have girls.29 But a standard two-stage least squares estimate of the
effect of marital breakup on an indicator for a given income level gives the difference between the two
CDFs. Thus, by summing the standard coefficient and the estimate of equation (6), we can likewise
2 8 Proof of equation (4): Z = i > D = Dz = Y = Yz for i = 0,1, so the numerator is:
E[(1- D)Y I Z = 1] - E[(1- D)Y I Z = 01] = E[(1- D )Yl - (1- D)Y 0 ]
By the monotonicity assumption this equals:
E[(1-DI)Y -(1-D)Y I D > Do]P[DI > Do] = E[Yo I D > Do]P[DI > Do]
Dividing by the denominator yields: E[Yo I DI > Do].
Since X is discrete, this proof can be extended to the case where we add controls.
29 By estimating the equation: DY = OD + Xp + q we can get I - 8 = E[Y I X;D, > Do] . The
proof is similar.
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trace out the CDF for compliers who have girls. Finally, we also estimate equation (6) using OLS, and
compare it to the instrumental variables estimate.
The effect of marital breakup on the distribution of outcomes
In each of Tables 4, 5, and 6, the columns of results labeled "First marriage intact" report
the CDF for those who remain married, estimated using the method described above. (Recall
that in the two-stage least squares regressions, the CDFs are estimated for the specific group of
women-"compliers"-who divorce or stay married in response to the sex of the first-born
child.) The columns labeled "Difference in CDFs: broken - intact" report the estimated
difference in CDFs between the compliers who have divorced and those who stay married, which
is the standard coefficient on breakup in the OLS or two-stage least squares estimation.
OLS estimates of the difference in distribution of income by marital breakup (first two columns
in Tables 4 and 5) tell a familiar story. In cross-section, those with broken first marriages have income
distributions -both household and others'- that are first-order stochastically dominated by those of
women with intact first marriages. That is, divorce is correlated with a uniform shift downward in
income at every point in the income distribution.3 0
The two-stage least squares estimates in Tables 4 and 5 give a more nuanced picture.3'
We do in fact find a large effect of marital breakup on the probability of being at the bottom of
the income distribution: women whose first marriage is broken are 42 percentage points more
30 Note also that the estimated income distribution for compliers whose first marriage remains
intact is first-order stochastically dominated by the income distribution for the full sample. This
result, which holds throughout Tables 4-6, is consistent with the view that the people who
respond to the instrument are typically of relatively low SES.
31 Note that the estimation of linear probability models results in some estimates that are slightly
outside the [0,1] interval, though always well within two standard errors of this interval. Despite
this drawback, we prefer to follow this methodology because of its transparency.
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likely (about twelve times as likely) to have less than $5000 in others' income, and 23
percentage points more likely (about 80 percent more likely) to have less than $10,000. While
legal transfers (which include child support and mean-tested transfers) reduce the number of
compliers with no income, over a quarter of the divorced compliers have no unearned income
even after accounting for transfers-compared to virtually none of the compliers who stay
married (results not shown).
The analysis of household income similarly shows a large effect of marital breakup on
the density at the bottom of the income distribution. Roughly one in six of those who experience
marital breakup have less than $5000 in household income, compared to virtually none of those
who remain married.32 Results follow a similar pattern for the high predicted-divorce
subsample, as expected. For the low predicted-divorce subsample, the effects are not significant
and do not demonstrate any consistent pattern, also as expected.
Interestingly, the two-stage estimates also show that those who divorce due to the
instrument (in both the full sample and the high predicted-divorce subsample) are somewhat
more likely to have income near the top of the distribution, although the differences are not
statistically significant. The reversal in the sign of the difference occurs at (in the case of others'
income) or below (in the case of household income) the mean of the distribution, explaining why
models for the mean find little effect of marital breakup on income. Previous literature (e.g.
Mueller and Pope 1980, Jacobs and Furstenberg 1986) finds that when divorced women remarry,
their second husband is typically more educated and has a higher occupational SES score
32 Although they cannot earn enough to make up for the loss in others' income, divorced
compliers do have a very large labor supply response to the loss. Since the distributional effect
on hours does not differ markedly from the mean responsiveness, a separate analysis is not
included here.
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(although at least some of this is due to life-cycle effects). In addition, Bedard and Deschenes
(2003) argue that many divorced mothers co-reside with their parents, who likely have higher
joint incomes than their husbands. The reversal in sign is more substantial for total household
income than for others' income, probably because that also includes top-end variation in
women's earnings as well as sources of other income (such as alimony and child support).
The results discussed thus far ignore one important aspect of divorce-namely, it reduces
family size. Thus even though income decreases at the bottom with divorce, women may not
necessarily end up worse off; on the other hand, if income gains at the top come primarily
through remarriage, the effect may be neutralized by increased family size. To estimate the
effect of divorce on the ratio of income to needs, we divide each woman's total household
income by the poverty line for a household of that size.
As shown in Table 6, we find that changes in family size do not mitigate our results. The
OLS estimates still indicate that marital breakup decreases normalized household income at all
levels. The two-stage least squares results indicate that virtually none of those still in their first
marriage have household income below the poverty line, while nearly a quarter of those whose
first marriage ended are below poverty. Compliers whose first marriage ended are, however,
significantly more likely to be above 400 percent of poverty than are compliers whose first
marriage remains intact. The results for the high-predicted divorce subsample are similar -
divorce significantly increases the probability of poverty and the effect reverses at the top of the
distribution, although the effect is not significant for the subsample. As always, the low-poverty
subsample shows no significant effect and no discernable pattern, consistent with our hypothesis.
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Discussion
Our results suggest that negative selection into divorce accounts for the observed
relationship between marital breakup and lower mean income. Yet marital breakup does have a
significant causal effect on the distribution of income: divorce increases the percent of women at
the bottom-and perhaps at the top-tail of the income distribution. In net, divorce causally
increases poverty, and perhaps inequality more generally, for women with children.
What would have been the poverty rate of women with children in 1995 had the fraction
of ever-divorced mothers not changed since 1980? In 1995 (the most recent year for which we
have data on marital history, from the CPS), the poverty rate for women with our sample
characteristics who are still in their first marriage was 8.7 percent, while the rate for women who
have ever divorced was 21.7 percent. Thus if divorce had stayed at its 1980 prevalence (17.2
percent ever divorced), the overall poverty rate in this sample would be:
Counterfactual poverty rate = (% ever divorced 1980)*(poverty rate I ever divorced 1995)
+ (% never divorced 1980)*(poverty rate I never divorced 1995)
= 0.172*0.217 + (1-0.172)*0.087 = 0.109,
or 10.9 percent. Because the prevalence of divorce rose to 28.6 percent, the poverty rate became:
Actual poverty rate = (% ever divorced 1995)*(poverty rate I ever divorced 1995)
+ (% never divorced 1995)*(poverty rate I never divorced 1995)
= 0.286*0.217 + (1-0.286)*0.087 = 0.124,
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or 12.4 percent. Thus the increase in divorce may potentially have caused an increase of 1.5
points, or 13.8 percent, in the poverty rate for women with our sample characteristics. If we
assume that the effect holds outside of those with our sample characteristics, we can conclude
that nearly 1.4 million more women and children were in poverty in 1995 than would have been
if the divorce rate had remained at its 1980 level.
We conclude by noting that our findings do not have clear-cut policy implications. While
some might interpret them as evidence for the importance of traditional family structures, others
may conclude that they emphasize the need for more generous welfare policies.
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The 5 percent 1980 Census data contain several measures that allow us to analyze a
woman's fertility history. These include the number of children ever born to a woman, the
number of marriages, the quarter as well as year of first birth, and the quarter and year of first
marriage. This information permits us to identify the sex of the first-born child for most women,
although not for women whose eldest child has left the household.
A substantial drawback of using cross-sectional data is the fact that we can only observe the sex
of the eldest child residing with a woman, whereas our true characteristic of interest is the sex of the
firstborn child. It is imperative that we create a sample of women for whom measurement error in the
sex of the observed first-born child has a classical structure.
To that end, we attempt to restrict the sample to those women observed with all their
biological children. We do so in order to limit the risk that our results will be affected by
differential attrition of boys and girls. In particular, we are concerned that boys may be
differentially likely to end up in the custody of their fathers in the event of marital breakup. In
fact, as Table A, panel 1, shows, girls are significantly less likely than boys to be living with
their father and not their mother. This pattern could lead to endogeneity of our instrument if the
sample were left uncorrected. If, in the event of divorce, fathers keep the sons and mothers keep
the daughters, there will be a spurious positive correlation in the overall sample between marital
breakup and the eldest observed child being a girl.
To address this issue, we exclude any woman for whom the number of children ever born
does not equal the number of children living with her. If a mother lives with stepchildren or
adopted children in a number that exactly offsets the number of her own children that are not
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living with her, this rule will fail to exclude her. We therefore further minimize the possibility of
including women who have non-biological children "standing in" for biological children by
including only women whose age at first birth is measured as between 19 and 44.
Limiting our sample to women who are living with all of their children reduces but does not
eliminate the threat that differential custody rates could bias our result-because we could still be more
likely to include divorced women with two girls than those with one boy and one girl or those with two
boys. We find, however, that mothers living with all their children and mothers in the overall population
are equally likely to be observed with a girl as the eldest child, which suggests that sex of the eldest
child is not a major determinant of living with all of one's children (See Table A, panel 2).
Second, we limit our sample to women whose first child was born after their first marriage, since
breakup of the first marriage is our focus. If instead we included out-of-wedlock births, we would be
concerned that the sex of the first child affected selection into the first marriage. To the extent that
people could learn the sex of the child before it was born and thereby select into "shotgun marriages,"
we may still have selection into first marriage. But ultrasound technology was not yet widely used in
1980 (Campbell 2000), so this threat is not of particular concern. In addition, because we can only
identify the beginning of the first marriage and not the end, we may include some women whose first
child was born after the breakup of the first marriage. But this should create only classical measurement
error in our first stage estimation.
Third, we look only at mothers whose eldest child is a minor, since those who still live with their
adult children may be a select group. Further, since girls are differentially likely to leave home early (at
ages 17 and 18), we restrict to mothers whose eldest child is under age 17. Fourth, we limit our sample
to white women because black women's childbearing and marital decisions may be quite different, and
fully modeling the differences would greatly complicate the analysis. Finally, we leave out women
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whose first child was a twin, both because different-sex twins would complicate our instrument and
because twins increase the number of children a woman has.
Selection into our restricted sample might be cause for concern, just as selection into the
labor market is cause for concern when measuring labor outcomes. To test for such a problem,
we generated the predicted probability that a woman was included in our sample based on age
and birthplace dummies. Then we re-ran our two-stage estimates, treating a woman's predicted
probability of inclusion as an endogenous regressor. Our first- and second-stage estimates were
quite stable with and without this variable.
To create our high- and low-predicted divorce subsamples, we create an exogenous risk
index (Table A, panel 3) by predicting "ever divorced" using age, age squared, age at first birth,
and dummies for place of birth and for high school dropout (recall that our sample includes only
women whose first birth occurs after age 19, so the decision on whether to graduate from high
school can be treated as pre-determined).
In summary, the limitations we place on the sample are designed to create a group of
women for whom we can measure the sex of the firstborn child with only classical measurement
error. These restrictions weaken the power of our first stage, but we believe this compromise is
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Table A. Specification Checks and Sample Construction
Panel 1 Dependent variable: Child is a girl






Panel 2 Dependent variable: Eldest child is a girl





Panel 3 Dependent variable: Ever divorced
Age 0.0264
(0.0003)
Age squared + 100 -0.0305
(0.0005)
Age at first birth -0.0025
(0.0001)
Dummy for high school dropout 0.0947
(0.0012)
Observations 1,092,433
NOTES: The sample in panel 1 includes white children under age 19 (the unit of observation is a child)
The sample in panel 2 includes women meeting the set of restrictions imposed throughout the paper, except
that we do not restrict to mothers living with all their children. That is, it includes white mothers who had
their first birth after marriage after age 18 and before age 45, had a single first birth, and whose eldest child
is under 17.
The sample in panel 3 includes white women who had their first birth after marriage, after age 18, and
before age 45, and had a single first birth. Controls also include birthplace dummies (147 categories)
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Previous research has convincingly shown that abortion legalization in the early 1970s
led to a significant drop in fertility at that time. But this decline may have either represented a
delay in births from a point where they were "unintended" to a point where they were
"intended," or they may have represented a permanent reduction in fertility. We combine data
from the 1970 U.S. Census and microdata from 1968 to 1999 Vital Statistics records to calculate
lifetime fertility of women in the 1930s through 1960s birth cohorts. We examine whether those
women who were born in early legalizing states and who passed through the early 1970s in their
peak childbearing years had differential lifetime fertility patterns compared to women born in
other states and in different birth cohorts. We consider the impact of abortion legalization on
both the number of children ever born as well as the distribution of number of children ever born.
Our results indicate that much of the reduction in fertility at the time abortion was legalized was
permanent in that women did not have more subsequent births as a result. We also find that this
result is largely attributable to an increase in the number of women who remained childless
throughout their fertile years.
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I. Introduction
The ability to control one's fertility through legal abortion is one of the most profound
changes in family planning of the last fifty years. The significant change in the cost of abortion
brought about by its legalization enabled women to abort pregnancies that would otherwise have
resulted in an unwanted birth. Past research has shown that women responded very strongly to
this incentive when abortion was legalized in the early 1970s, reducing their fertility by at least 4
percent (Levine et al., 1999).
The immediate drop in the birth rate in response to legal abortion does not, however,
necessarily indicate that women have fewer children over the rest of their childbearing years.
Many of the women who chose to abort rather than have an unwanted birth still had a number of
fertile years remaining. If the births that did not occur were "replaced" by additional births
subsequently, then women would not experience a net reduction in lifetime fertility. Therefore,
the short-run impacts on birth rates estimated in earlier work may not represent long-run
reductions in birth rates and completed fertility.33
It is important to understand the extent to which the short-run fertility is permanent
because of the different implications for subsequent child outcomes. For instance, in response to
the legalization of abortion, Gruber et al. (1999) find improvements in child well-being and
Donohue and Levitt (2001) report a reduction in crime when those children mature. One
explanation for these findings is that those children who were born are differentially selected
among those who could have been born if abortion had not been legal. But if births are just
33 Angrist and Evans (1999) raise this issue as well in their analysis of the longer term outcomes for teens, whose
fertility fell dramatically when abortion was legalized in the early 1970s. Our approach is partially aided by the
passage of more time since abortion was legalized, so that completed fertility (or "virtually" completed fertility) can
be addressed for more birth cohorts. In addition, our use of Vital Statistics Microdata in addition to Census data
substantially improves the precision of our estimates.
timed differently, then any selection effect would strongly depend upon whether children's
outcomes are determined by the fixed characteristics of mothers or the age at which those
mothers give birth. If it is the mother's fixed characteristics that matter, then the effects reported
in Gruber et al. (1999) and Donahue and Levitt (2001) should diminish over time since the
children those mothers would have had will eventually be born. If it is the age of the mother that
matters, then even the delay will lead to lasting improvements in child well-being.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of abortion legalization on lifecycle
fertility, beginning from the point at which abortion was legalized through the remainder of
women's childbearing years. We combine data from the 1970 U.S. Census and microdata from
1968 to 1999 Vital Statistics records to calculate lifetime fertility of women in cohorts born in
the 1930s through 1960s. We examine whether those women who were born in early legalizing
states and who passed through the early 1970s in their peak abortion and childbearing years had
differential lifetime fertility patterns compared to women born in other states and in different
birth cohorts. We consider the impact of abortion legalization on both the number of children
ever born as well as the distribution of number of children ever born.
We find that much of the reduction in fertility at the time abortion was legalized was
permanent; women did not have many more subsequent births as a result. We also find that this
result is attributable to an increase in the number of women who remained childless throughout
their fertile years.
II. Background
The process by which abortion was legalized in the United States in the early 1970s is an
integral component of the identification strategy we employ. A detailed description of the events
leading up to the legalization of abortion in the United States is provided in Garrow (1994).
Briefly, abortion became widely available in five states in 1970. In four of these states (New
York, Washington, Alaska, and Hawaii), there was a repeal of anti-abortion laws. In the fifth,
California, there was a "de facto" legalization, since in late 1969 the California State Supreme
Court ruled that the pre-1967 law outlawing abortion was unconstitutional. Following the 1973
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion became legal in all states. These events
contributed to a dramatic increase in the frequency with which women chose to end a pregnancy
through abortion; the abortion rate almost doubled from 16.3 abortions per 1,000 women aged
15-44 in 1973 to 29.3 in 1980 (Finer and Henshaw, 2003).
Levine et al. (1999) use the natural experiment provided by the staggered introduction of
legalized abortion across states to estimate its impact on contemporaneous birth rates. They
categorize states by abortion legality in different years to jointly exploit two legislative changes.
They first compare changes in fertility rates in the "early legalizing" (or "repeal") states from
before 1970 to after 1970, relative to other ("non-repeal") states where abortion was still illegal.
Then they reverse the treatment in 1973, comparing births in those states where the Roe decision
legalized abortion to the repeal states where it had already been legal. The results indicate that
abortion legalization in the early 1970s reduced the fertility rate by over 4 percentage points.
Teens and women age 35 and over experienced much larger reductions in fertility, as did
nonwhite and unmarried women.
As an extension to their analysis, Levine et al. provide estimates separately comparing
repeal states to non-repeal states that vary by their distance to repeal states, using the distance
categories of within 250 miles (from closest population centroids), 250 to 750 miles, and greater
than 750 miles. If we assume that women in closer non-repeal states were more likely to cross
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state lines to obtain an abortion (e.g. those in New Jersey crossing into New York), then the
effects of abortion legalization should be strongest for those living farthest from the early repeal
states. They also find that this effect was much larger when early repeal states are compared to
more distant comparison states, suggesting that travel between states dampened the estimated
impact.
III. Methodology
To examine the impact of abortion legalization on life-cycle fertility, we will again
exploit the quasi-experiment provided by the variation across states in the exact timing of
abortion legalization in the early 1970s. The main methodological extension in the present
analysis is to convert the focus on period effects that Levine et al. estimated to a focus on cohort
effects. The period effect analysis operated by comparing women at different ages at the time of
the law changes (either early repeal or Roe v. Wade), and measuring their current fertility rates.
The cohort analysis instead compares women who passed through these different legal states at
the time when they were most likely to be affected by abortion availability, and examines
measures of completed fertility.
A. Defining "Treatment Cohorts"
We focus on those cohorts who were most likely to be affected by changes in abortion
law in the early 1970s based on their age at that time. Women in these cohorts from repeal states
experienced greater exposure to legal abortion and may have had different fertility patterns over
the remainder of their lives as a result. Once these "treatment cohorts" are defined, the
methodological approach is analogous to that based on period effects. Women in the different
sets of states in cohorts before the treatment cohorts and after the treatment cohorts should have
been equally affected by changes in abortion policy; abortion would have either been uniformly
illegal (for the earlier cohorts) or uniformly legal (for the later cohorts) during the years in which
they were most at-risk of unwanted pregnancies.
To define our "treatment cohorts," we extend the analysis in Levine et al. to examine the
impact of abortion legalization by exact age, rather than by broad age groups, using Vital
Statistics microdata between 1968 and 1980 (described in the next section). Comparable to
Levine et al.'s findings (albeit with greater age-specificity), we find that legalized abortion had
the biggest relative impact on births to teens and to older women. The impact is largest at age
15, declines to zero by age 28, and then rises again.34
For the purposes of the present analysis, however, these results are somewhat misleading
because they reflect the impact on relative birth rates. In 1970, birth rates are highest between
the late teens and late 20s, peaking at age 23, and are low in the early teens and into the 30s and
40s. Therefore, the large relative impact of abortion legalization on births at older ages needs to
be tempered by the fact that the base is relatively low. The absolute impact on the number of
births is small at older ages.
To address the absolute impact on fertility, we repeat Levine et al.'s estimating strategy,
but replace the natural logarithm of the birth rate as the dependent variable with the birth rate in
levels. As such, parameter estimates represent the absolute effect on the birth rate rather than the
relative effect based on the percentage change. When we make this change, we see that ages 16
through 26 represent the peak ages at which the number of births was affected.35 At these ages,
births fell by roughly 6 per 1,000 women in response to abortion legalization. Therefore, we
34 Detailed results are provided in Ananat et al. (2004).
35 Detailed results of this analysis are provided in Ananat et al. (2004) as well.
would expect the largest impact on lifecycle fertility to hit those cohorts who passed through the
early 1970s between the ages of 16 and 26.
The next step requires transitioning from these age-specific period effects to a definition
of the treatment cohorts. We know that abortion laws differed between repeal and other states
over the 1970 to 1972 period, which, given the nine month delay of pregnancy, largely applies to
births in 1971 to 1973. We can combine this information with the fact that the peak ages of
abortion legalization's impact was 16 to 26. This means that the birth cohorts of the later 1940s
and earlier 1950s were the ones whose fertility was most directly affected by abortion
legalization. As an approximation, in our analysis we define the 1946 to 1955 birth cohorts to
represent the treatment cohorts.36 If abortion legalization in the early 1970s reduced fertility at
those ages for these women, any permanent impact on lifetime fertility would show up as a gap
in children ever born between those who lived in early repeal states and others. Women born
after 1955 would have entered childbearing ages following the Roe decision, so they would have
faced a lifetime of exposure to legal abortion regardless of their state of residence. Similarly,
women born in the 1930s and earlier 1940s were in their later stages of childbearing by the early
1970s. These women passed through their peak childbearing years with no legal abortion access,
regardless of where they lived.
B. Empirical Model
These results bring us to an empirical specification of our model of completed fertility.
We estimate models of the form:
36 Our results are not sensitive to small changes in the start and end date of the treatment cohort. We also
experimented with alternative specifications within the 1946-1955 cohort window (like breaking it up into two
windows - one from 1946-1950 and one from 1951-1955), but found no pattern strong enough to statistically
distinguish.
CF, = pl*REPEAL*D4655 + P2 *REPEALs*D(post55) (1)
+ 8s + 8c + 8s*TREND + Ccs
where CF,, represents alternative measures of completed fertility in cohort c in state s, D4655 is
an indicator of the 1946-1955 birth cohorts and D(post55) is an indicator of post-1955 birth
cohorts. We include state-specific (s) and cohort-specific (c) fixed effects to capture
longstanding differences in fertility patterns across states over time as well as aggregate patterns
of changing fertility preferences over time. We also allow the state-specific differences to trend
over time. The omitted term here is the difference before 1946 between repeal and non-repeal
states, which is captured by the set of state fixed effects. The coefficient 1 measures the
difference in completed fertility between repeal and non-repeal states for those women born in
the 1946-1955 period (the treatment cohorts), relative to those born before 1946 (who were
beyond prime childbearing age when abortion was legalized). The coefficient p2 measures the
difference in completed fertility between repeal and non-repeal states for the set of women born
after 1955 (for whom there should be no effect since they were all subject to legal abortion
throughout their childbearing years), relative to those born before 1946. As with the period tests
of Levine et al., this framework provides two tests for the effect of abortion legalization: that 01
is negative, and that 32 is zero.
It is important to recognize the additional power that we obtain by including the
interaction for the post-1955 cohort. Without it we would be unable to differentiate an early
repeal effect from a differential trend by repeal versus non-repeal states. That is, the early repeal
of abortion, followed by Roe v. Wade, allows researchers to go beyond the typical "difference-
in-difference" setup, in which it is difficult to distinguish policy-induced changes from
underlying trends. By finding both an effect on fertility for the treatment cohort and that there is
no effect for later cohorts, we are able to confirm that there is a causal effect of abortion
availability and not an underlying trend that differs between these sets of states.
There are two other important differences in this model relative to standard difference-in-
difference models, like Levine et al. (1999), which rely on contemporaneous data. First, states
no longer represent the state where the birth occurred since states are designed to identify the
mother's state of residence in the early 1970s. As described below, however, it is impossible to
determine states of residence in the early 1970s from the available data, so we use mothers'
states of birth instead. Using state of birth has two advantages for our purposes: it is exogenous
to any mobility decisions related to abortion availability37; and it is a fixed characteristic that
allows us to merge the two data sources we use below. Second, we no longer are able to control
for other time varying, state-specific covariates. In the cohort context, individuals are potentially
influenced by some complex function of social conditions since they were born and it is unclear
how to specifically control for them in a regression framework.38 Instead, we rely on state of
birth fixed effects along with linear trends within states of birth to control for these other
factors. 3 9
37 Implicitly, we use repeal status of the state of birth to instrument for repeal status of the state a woman lived in
during her childbearing years. If migration between repeal and non-repeal states increased over time, then state of
birth would be a weaker instrument for later cohorts, causing our estimate of P2 to be biased toward zero and
overstating the evidence for our hypothesis. However, migration rates between early-legalizing and other states
have not changed significantly over the period in question: in 1980, 90.02% of women of childbearing age were
living in a state whose repeal status was the same as that of their state of birth; in 2000, the analogous proportion
was 90.21%. Therefore legalization timing in a woman's state of birth appears to be an equally strong instrument
for exposure to legalization in older and younger cohorts.
38 One type of time varying, state-specific covariate that is more easily incorporated into this framework is exposure
to other relevant social policies during women's childbearing years. We experimented with two such variables:
number of years of exposure to legal access to contraception between the ages of 18 and 20 (derived from the data in
Bailey, 2006) and the number of years of exposure to Medicaid funding of abortion (derived from the data in
Levine, 2004). These policies both varied over states and time, so women in different state/year of birth cohorts
would have different exposure to these policies over their childbearing years. Since these policies are also related to
abortion access, they have the potential to bias our results. Nevertheless, when we included these additional
variables neither were statistically significant and including them had very little impact on the estimated repeal/year
interactions. As a result, we chose to report the results omitting these variables.
39 The findings reported later in the paper are similar when we control for state-specific quadratic trends.
In addition to estimating models of this form, we also follow Levine et al. and estimate
models comparing completed fertility to women in repeal states to women in non-repeal states
who differ in their distance to repeal states. If travel between states occurred in response to the
early legalization of abortion in repeal states, then the estimated impacts should be greater when
comparing repeal states to more distant non-repeal states.
IV. Description of the Data
Based on this discussion, we need data providing measures of women's completed
fertility for different birth cohorts of women along with geographical identifiers that can isolate
those women exposed to the early legalization of abortion in repeal states. No single dataset
provides all of this information. We rely on the Public Use Micro Sample from the 1970 Census
and data from the Vital Statistics Natality Detail Files between 1968 and 1999 to construct
measures of completed fertility for birth cohorts beginning in the 1930s and going through the
1960s. This combination provides a unique opportunity to examine the life-cycle fertility of the
relevant treatment and control cohorts.
The Vital Statistics data represent individual records on births that took place in the
United States between 1968 and 1999.40 Microdata prior to 1968 are not publicly available.
These data are invaluable because they specify the parity of the birth, the mother's age (from
which we can estimate the year she was born), and the mother's state of birth.4 ' With these data,
40 From 1985 onward, these data represent a complete count of births. Prior to 1972, births were sampled at a 50
percent rate nationwide. In the intervening period, some states sampled at a 50 percent rate and others included all
births. In our analysis, we applied appropriate weights to provide estimates of all births.
41 For a very small number of births, this information is missing. These births are not included in the analysis.
These data also contain information regarding whether the birth was a singleton or part of a multiple birth. The
issue of multiple births is an interesting one in the present context, because fertility treatments over time have
increased the likelihood of multiple births and may have made it more difficult to achieve "optimal" family size if
multiple births result from a pregnancy for which only one child was intended. To pursue this issue, we estimated
rates of singleton births for 1971 and 1999 separately for repeal and non-repeal states. Our results indicate that
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we can attribute every birth that takes place in the United States to the mothers' state/year of
birth cohort.42 Moreover, we can use the information available on the parity of each birth to help
formulate the distribution of the number of births to each woman over her childbearing years.43
For those women born in the mid 1950s and later, these Vital Statistics microdata contain
a record of every birth they have had. Since fertility trails off considerably after age 35 and is
very low after age 40, birth records for the 1968 through 1999 period will capture most, if not all
all births to women born as recently as the mid 1960s. Therefore, these data on their own are
sufficient to measure completed (or almost completed) fertility for roughly a decade's worth of
birth cohorts. But these data are inadequate for capturing completed fertility for women born
before the mid 1950s since they will already have given birth to at least some of their children
prior to 1968. If they give birth to additional children after 1968, we will see them in the Vital
Statistics data from later years, but we would miss any women whose fertility is completed
before 1968.
To count births prior to 1968 we use data from the 1970 Census, which provides
information on both women's state of birth and their children ever born.44 Based on these data,
we can count children ever born who are more than two years old, and thus were born before
1968, by mothers' birth cohort and state. This becomes a baseline to which we can add
information on later births from the Vital Statistics data. For example, consider the cohort of
women born in 1940. We use the 1970 census data to measure how many children those women
singleton births have declined slightly over time (from 98 to 97 percent) and that there is no difference in these
values between repeal and non-repeal states.
42 Another minor limitation of these data is that births to women who were born in the United States but gave birth
in another country would not be captured in these data. It is our impression that this is a very infrequent event and
we ignore it here.
43 Each birth at a given level of parity contributes to the counts in a cumulative birth distribution, which can then be
converted to a probability distribution.
44 The Census data we use come from the standardized Minnesota Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles
and Sobek 2003).
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had through 1967. We then use the Vital Statistics data to track the additional births to this
cohort that occurred in 1968 or later. Since both sources of data are sorted by state of birth, we
can be sure that we are tracking the same women.
We use these combined Census and Vital Statistics microdata to create measures of
lifetime fertility for women born in the 1930s through the 1960s.45 For the earliest of these
cohorts, the Census data captures virtually all of their fertility.4 6 For those born after the mid
1950s their fertility history is virtually entirely captured by the Vital Statistics microdata. For the
intervening cohorts, these two data sources are combined to create complete fertility histories.
Using the available data, we are able to construct measures of the number of children ever born
by age 25, by age 30, by age 35, and then total completed fertility.47 We convert counts of births
by these ages to measures of children ever born per woman by incorporating estimates from the
1970 Census on the number of women in each state/year of birth cohort. In addition, we have
constructed distributions of the number of children born to each woman in each state/year of
birth cohort and focus, in particular, on the percentage of women who never have children.4 8
45 Although the approach we use to construct these data provides what we believe is the best method available, it is
not without limitations. First, the Vital Statistics data do not contain information on mother's state of birth in 1968,
1969, and 1972. To overcome this, we estimate the number of births in those years by mother's state of birth by
using rates of migration between birth states and state of residence computed from the 1970, 1971, and 1973 data. A
second limitation of the Census data is that it only provides information on an individual's age and quarter of birth,
without specific birth dates. We employ an algorithm that assumes all responses were filed on April 1St to determine
the number of children born since the beginning of 1968 and then take the difference between this and children ever
born to determine the number born prior to 1968. These issues are described in greater detail in Ananat et al.
(2004); we do not believe that they have any systematic effect on our results.
46 For example, the 1933 birth cohort would have been 35 years old in 1968. Their completed fertility included an
average of 3.17 children; 3.04 of them were born by age 35.
47 Where sufficient data are available, we define total completed fertility to include births up to age 44. In some
instances, however, we use births up to age 39 since so little fertility takes place after that. We have tested the
sensitivity of our results to including births up to age 39 for all cohorts and found little difference to that reported
here.
48 All of these data can be constructed separately for white women and non-white women (blacks or other race)
separately. We have done so and estimated all the models reported subsequently separately by race. Not
surprisingly, results for white women look very similar to those for the whole population because whites represent a
large majority of the population. Point estimates for non-whites were also similar, but they lacked the precision to




Before presenting estimation results from equation (1) using our constructed data on
completed fertility, we first present an analysis that relies exclusively on contemporaneous age-
specific birth rates beginning in 1968 from the Vital Statistics microdata. We attribute births at
each age in each year to the relevant birth cohort of the mother, defined as the year of birth
minus mother's age. For example, we can construct a birth history for the 1959 birth cohort by
using birth rates at age 15 from 1974, age 16 from 1975, age 17, from 1976, and so on. We then
plot the percentage difference in age-specific birth rates between women in repeal states and
other states for three selected cohorts. For the 1959 birth cohort, the differential timing across
states in abortion legalization would have had no impact on the difference in birth rates since
these women would not have reached their childbearing years until after Roe v. Wade.
Therefore, this cohort can serve as a control group.
The results of this analysis are plotted in Figure 1 for the 1949, 1954, and 1959 birth
cohorts. Women in repeal states are more likely to have their births at later ages, as indicated by
the general upward slope of these lines. The treated cohorts are those born in 1954 and 1949,
who would have been 17 and 22 years old in 1971, respectively, when abortion was legalized in
the early repeal states. The trends in age-specific fertility for these cohorts clearly show the
period effects that past research has found. Age-specific birth rates for women in repeal states in
the 1954 birth cohort show a clear drop exactly at age 17 relative to women in non-repeal states
and to other birth cohorts. This drop lasts for the few years in which abortion laws differed
across states and then reverts back to the pattern for the control cohorts. Similarly, births to
women in repeal states in the 1949 birth cohort fall exactly at age 22, which corresponds to their
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births in 1971, and remain lower just for the three years in which abortion policies differed
across states. 4 9
The advantage of this figure is that it enables us to compare births at later ages for these
cohorts that were clearly contemporaneously affected by differential abortion access. The
impression one would take away from this figure is that the contemporaneous reduction in births
did not alter childbearing patterns at later ages. The age-profile in the difference in births for the
1954 cohort is no different after the early 20s from that of the control cohort. If anything,
women in the 1949 birth cohorts from repeal states had fewer births over the remainder of their
main childbearing years compared to women in other states and the control cohort. These results
provide the first evidence that the reduction in period fertility attributable to abortion legalization
may have been permanent.
Main Results
Figure 2 and the top panel of Table 1 present the main results of our cohort-based
analysis examining the impact of abortion legalization on children ever born. Figure 2 focuses
on children ever born throughout the childbearing years and Table 1 separately considers
children ever born by age 25, 30, 35, and completed fertility (by age 44, or age 39 for cohorts
who have not yet reached 44 in 1999).50 As we described earlier, we are looking for a gap to
49 Note that births for the 1949 cohort are only reported beginning at age 19, which corresponds to their fertility in
1968, the first year in which Vital Statistics microdata are available.
50 All fertility information before 1968 comes from the 1970 Census, which only includes data on children ever born
when the Census was completed. It is impossible to date when births occurred prior to that year in those data. This
explains why data on births by age 25 and age 30 are only available as far back as the 1943 and 1938 birth cohorts,
respectively. To maintain at least some balance to our sample, we do not use birth cohorts prior to 1933 since we
would not be able to date births by age 35 prior to that year. At the other extreme, births by age 35 are only
available through the 1964 birth cohort since our micro Vital Statistics data ends in 1999. In addition, children ever
born represents births to age 44, except for the 1956 through 1960 birth cohorts in which births to age 39 are used
since these birth cohorts had not yet reached age 44 by 1999. We have estimated all of our models using data for
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emerge in the difference in children ever born between women in repeal and other states
beginning around the 1946 birth cohorts that would then disappear for the post-1955 birth
cohorts.
Figure 2 displays the difference in children ever born between women born in repeal
states and other states over time. The results indicate a clear upward trend in this difference, as
illustrated by the trend line added to the figure. Apparently, it used to be the case that women in
non-repeal states had more children than women in repeal states, but this difference has been
slowly going away. This highlights the need to consider the deviation from state-specific trends.
Such a deviation from trend is clearly apparent for the relevant birth cohorts, those born between
1946 and 1955. For that set of cohorts, there is a sharp reduction in the differential of children
ever born between repeal and non-repeal states.
This conclusion is confirmed in the top panel of Table 1. By the end of childbearing (the
final column), we see that abortion legalization reduced children ever born by 0.054.51
Moreover, the difference in children ever born that emerged for the 1946 to 1955 birth cohorts in
repeal states was statistically eliminated in the post-1955 cohorts. The coefficient for that cohort
is statistically and substantively insignificant. This further confirms the causal interpretation of
our finding. The effects we estimate here are present only for the 1946-1955 cohorts, relative to
both cohorts born before 1946 (the omitted group), and cohorts born after 1955; these are not just
trends in differential state fertility behavior.
Evidence in the top panel of Table 1 also suggests that the similar reductions in fertility
are observed by ages 25, 30, and 35. By each of those ages, we see that children ever born to
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just the 1943 through 1960 birth cohorts, which provide relevant information for children ever born by each age (and
assuming that "completed fertility" ends at age 39) and obtained results comparable to those reported below.
51 To provide some perspective on the magnitude of this number, roughly 3 million women were born between 1946
and 1955 in repeal states. If the each had 0.054 fewer children, this would amount to about 150,000 fewer children.
women in repeal states had fallen by .07 relative to women in non-repeal states in the 1946 to
1955 birth cohorts. Importantly, this gap is statistically and substantively insignificant in the
post 1955 cohorts (except, perhaps, by age 25). Although these point estimates for the 1946 to
1955 birth cohorts by age 35 are slightly larger than that by the end of childbearing, they are not
statistically different. These results suggest that the reduction in births associated with abortion
legalization in the early 1970s was essentially permanent. It does not appear that much, if any,
of it was made up in the form of additional births at later ages.
As a rough assessment of the validity of these findings, we estimated models comparable
to that in Levine et al. (1999) using age-specific birth rates estimated from 1968 to 1980 Vital
Statististics microdata. We then applied the estimates of the impact of abortion legalization on
these birth rates (a 6.7% reduction) to the 1970 age-specific birth rates to determine the steady
state impact on children ever born. The results suggest that children ever born would have fallen
by 0.043, which is comparable to (and not significantly different from) our estimate in Table 1 of
0.054 by the end of childbearing.
Distance Estimates
A means of confirming this striking finding is to take advantage of the fact that the non-
repeal states are better "controls" the farther they were from the repeal states (due to the
possibility of travel to the repeal states from nearby states). Following Levine et al., we can
divide the non-repeal states into those within 250 miles, between 250 and 750 miles, and more
than 750 miles from repeal states.52 By doing so, we can assess whether our results are stronger
for the farther away set of control states, as we would expect.
52 States in each category include:
Repeal: AK, CA, HI, NY, and WA
Distance < 250: AZ, CT, DE, DC, ME, MD, MA, MI, NV, NH, NJ, OH, OR, PA, RI, VT
Distance > 250 and < 750: CO, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, MN, MS, MT, NM, NC, SC, TN, UT, VA, WV, WI, WY
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Figure 3 and the remainder of Table 1 report the results of our analysis, separately for
control states of different distances to the repeal states. Figure 3 displays the difference in
children ever born by the end of childbearing to women in repeal states relative to women in
each of these distance categories by mother's birth cohort. Again, this figure shows that women
in repeal states historically had fewer births, but it also shows that the difference is greater when
they are compared to further away states. In each case the general trend is toward a narrowing of
the gap. But for far away non-repeal states, another clear pattern is the break from trend that
occurs in the difference in children ever born among cohorts born in the late 1940s and early
1950s. No such trend is apparent when comparing children ever born between repeal states and
the nearest group of comparison states.
These assessments are confirmed in the bottom three panels of Table 1. By age 25,
children ever born to women in repeal states born between 1946 and 1955 fell by an insignificant
amount relative to women in the closest group of comparison states, by 0.085 children relative to
the middle distance group, and by 0.099 children relative to the most distant group of
comparison states. Moreover, the estimates are roughly stable throughout the remainder of the
childbearing years. And, for all distances, the results are largely insignificant for the cohorts
born after 1955.53 These results provide further evidence of a causal and largely permanent
impact of abortion legalization on children ever born.
Distribution of Children Ever Born
We turn our attention now to the impact of abortion legalization on the distribution of
children ever born rather than just the count. We pay particular attention to the percentage of
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Distance > 750: AL, AR, FL, KS, LA, MS, NE, ND, OK, SD, TX.
53 The coefficient on the post-1955 interaction for the middle distance states is statistically significant, contrary to
the model's predictions. In a table estimating this many coefficients, one might expect random variation to provide
an occasional odd result and this would be our interpretation of this finding.
childless women, which is of primary importance since it is the only point in this distribution for
which we have an unambiguous prediction; more women should remain childless. Since the
remainder of the distribution should be shifting to the left, it is difficult to tell whether the flow
out of a particular level should be greater than the flow in from a larger value (e.g. the share of
women who only had one child will be falling as those who otherwise would have one child
move to zero children, but it will also be rising as those who otherwise would have two children
move to one child).
The main results of this analysis are reported in Figure 4 and in the top panel of Table 2.
Figure 4 displays the difference in the percentage of childless women between repeal and non-
repeal states by birth cohort. For all birth cohorts before the mid 1940s, this difference is
reasonably stable. But by the mid 1940s we begin to see a sizeable jump in the number of
childless women in repeal states relative to non-repeal states. The gap widens through the early
1950s and then recedes, just as we would predict if the cause of the gap was differential abortion
access. By 1956, the difference is at the same level as before the "treatment" cohort began in
1946.
Table 2 presents a regression-based version of these results that also includes the
percentage of women with different numbers of children. The results presented here confirm our
observations from Figure 2 in that abortion legalization is estimated to have increased the
number of childless women in the treatment cohort by 3.47 percent. Once again, there is no
significant impact on the post-1955 cohort, consistent with the causal interpretation of this
finding. 5 4
54 Another interesting simulation estimates the number of children that those who became childless would have had
if abortion were not legalized. If the number of women having children fell by 3.47 percentage points and this
reduction led to a reduction in children ever born by 0.054, then it must have been the case that these women who
remain childless otherwise would have had .054/.0347 = 1.57 children if abortion remained illegal.
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The evidence regarding the impact at other points in this distribution is not that strong.
Although we see a reduction in the number of women with one child and two children in the
1946 to 1955 repeal cohorts, a similar reduction is also observed for the later birth cohorts in
those states. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute this change to abortion legalization itself as
compared to some other ongoing trend that differed across states in the later birth cohorts.
Figure 5 and the remainder of Table 2 conduct the analogous exercises differentiating
comparison states by their distance to repeal states. In Figure 5 we see that the difference in the
percentage of childless women between repeal states and the closest set of non-repeal states was
stable across birth cohorts. But as the distance increases across comparison states, we see the
gap in the percentage of childless women for the late 1940s and early 1960s birth cohorts grow.
The bottom three panels of Table 2 confirm these impressions. Relative to the closest
group of comparison states, there was no statistically significant increase in the percentage of
childless women among women born in repeal states between 1946 and 1955. Relative to the
middle distance and farthest distance groups, however, these women are estimated to be 3.89
percent and 5.45 percent more likely to be childless. The pattern by repeal status, birth cohort,
and distance to repeal states provides strong evidence that this finding is causally related to
abortion legalization.
Discussion and Implications of Lifecycle Fertility Results
The results from this analysis tell a very consistent story: the early availability of abortion
in the repeal states led to a decline not only in contemporaneous but in permanent fertility. This
reduction in lifetime fertility is largely attributable to an increase in the number of women who
complete their fertile years without having any children. This finding is clear both graphically
and statistically. And it is confirmed both by the absence of any differential effect for cohorts
born after 1955, and by the fact that the effect is much stronger the farther away the control
states were from the early repeal states.
These results are also substantively large. The 1945 birth cohort, which had already
passed through its peak childbearing years by the time abortion was legalized, averaged about
2.4 births per women; about 11.3 percent had no children at all.55 By the 1960 birth cohort,
which was fully exposed to legalized abortion in all states at the time they hit childbearing age,
each woman had 1.9 children on average; 18.2 percent had no children. Our overall estimates
imply that abortion availability lowered the number of children ever born by 0.054, and the odds
of being childless by 3.6 percent. These figures account for 11 and 52 percent of the time series
changes in these variables.
Moreover, this calculation likely provides a lower bound of the effect of legalized
abortion because it does not account for the fact that some women in non-repeal states traveled to
repeal states prior to the Roe decision. Using our estimates based on the control states farthest
from the early repeal states, we would be able to explain 17 and 79 percent of the time series
change in these variables.
Other Outcomes for Women
The fact that abortion availability had such a fundamental impact on the lifecycle fertility
patterns of women raises the issue of whether legalization had impacts on other aspects of these
women's lives as well. Women who reduced the total number of children they had or chose
never to have any at all may have invested in more education and worked more, which would
have led to higher wages. Their marital decisions may have been altered as well. Changes in
55 This estimate is based on the data employed in this project. Estimates based on data from Current Population
Fertility Supplements are more like 14 percent.
both earnings and family composition effects also may have affected their poverty rates and
welfare participation.
We attempted to investigate this by looking at measures of these outcomes available in
the decennial Census. In order to focus on the full effects of reduced fertility, we looked at
outcomes for women aged 35 to 44, for whom most childbearing is complete.56 We observed the
outcomes of the various cohorts of interest at these ages by pooling multiple Censuses.
Observations for women born between 1930 and 1935 come from the 1970 Census, so that the
outcomes of those born in 1930, for example, are measured at age 40, while the outcomes of the
1935 cohort are measured at age 35. For the 1936 to 1945 cohorts, observations come from the
1.980 Census; for the 1946 to 1955 cohorts, from the 1990 Census; and for the 1956 to 1960
cohorts, from the 2000 Census.
We estimated models comparable in format to those reported earlier regarding children
ever born to assess the impact of abortion legalization on women's outcomes, categorizing
women according to state and year of birth and then examining the patterns in outcomes over
time between women born in repeal and non-repeal states. The outcomes examined include: the
probability of having completed high school or having completed college; current labor force
participation; poverty status, and household income as a percent of the poverty line. Using these
samples, we were unable to identify effects of increased fertility control on any of these
outcomes, but our results were not sufficiently precise to rule out such effects. Apparently, the
availability of virtually universal Vital Statistics data on fertility provided statistical power in our
earlier analysis that we were unable to attain relying exclusively on the 5 percent samples (or, in
the 1970 Census, a 4 percent sample) available in the Census data.
56 Ideally, we would focus on a somewhat older age range, but the youngest of treated women, who were 15 in 1970,
had only reached age 45 by 2000.
o I(I
VI. Conclusions
It is clear from past research that the legalization of abortion in the U.S. induced a major
change in fertility. Estimates from past research, replicated here, suggest that total fertility fell
by roughly 5 percent when abortion was legalized. Previous research on fertility has emphasized
the importance of decomposing fertility changes into temporary fertility (timing) effects and
permanent (completed fertility) effects. Yet this has not been done for this critical change in the
nature of birth planning.
In this paper, we directly investigate the impact of abortion legalization on the lifecycle
pattern of fertility of cohorts affected by legalization. The power of our analysis derives from
the observation that abortion legalization had its primary effects on those aged 16 to 26; for
younger and older ages, there was either a sufficiently small effect of abortion access, or
sufficiently low baseline fertility. Those ages 16 to 26 in the early 1970s, when abortion laws
differed across states, were mainly in the cohorts born between 1946 and 1955. Thus, by
comparing differences in children ever born between women in early repeal states to women in
other states during the 1946 to 1955 window relative to the analogous difference for women born
before and after those years, we can provide a causal estimate of the impact of abortion
legalization on lifetime fertility.
Our results are striking. It appears that the response of fertility to legalization was largely
composed of reductions in completed fertility, not changes in timing. Moreover, abortion
legalization is found to have led to a very large rise in childless women in these treatment
cohorts. The causal nature of our findings is confirmed by the comparison to other cohorts
surrounding the treatment cohort, and by the fact that the relationship is strongest relative to the
most distant states whose residents could not benefit from early legalization.
There are several important implications of these findings. First, they suggest that
improved fertility control does not simply lead to changes in fertility timing, as suggested by
some other papers. Indeed, the majority of the effect of abortion legalization was permanent and
not attributable to timing effects. Second, they suggest that the availability of abortion can
explain a sizeable share of the time series trend in reduced completed fertility and in childless
women over these birth cohorts. Finally, there are potentially important implications for the
long-term well-being of these cohorts of mothers from the improved fertility control. We were
unable to draw strong conclusions about these implications from the available data, but this is a
worthy goal for future research.
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Table 1: Estimated Impact of Abortion Legalization on Children Ever Born, by Age
Children Ever Born by:
End of
Age 25 Age 30 Age 35 Childbearing
Mean of Dependent Variable (all states) 1.10 1.73 2.16 2.48
Repeal States Relative to All Non-Repeal States
Repeal*1946-1955 birth cohorts
Repeal*post-1955 birth cohorts





















Repeal States Relative to Non-Repeal States within 250 Miles of a Repeal State






















Repeal States Relative to Non-Repeal States between 250 and 750 Miles from a Repeal State
Repeal*1946-1955 birth cohorts
Repeal*post-1955 birth cohorts





















Repeal States Relative to Non-Repeal States greater than 750 Miles from a Repeal State
Repeal* 1945-1955 birth cohorts

















Sample Size (birth cohorts*states) 432 512 512 432
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression represents the average children ever born to women by each age.
The "end of childbearing" is defined to be the oldest age for which births occur. For younger cohorts additional births
are likely to result after the period for which data is available here. To address this, I only include the 1960 and
earlier birth cohorts whose fertility at least through age 39 is recorded. Since so few births occur after that, I define
lifetime births to equal the births that have occurred through the last age observed. All specifications include state
and cohort-specific fixed effects along with state-specific trends. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity
and an arbitrary covariance structure within birth states (i.e. clustered on state of birth).
z 2.4-
Table 2: Estimated Impact of Abortion Legalization on the Distribution of Children Ever Born
(standard errors in parentheses)
Number of Children Ever Born:
1 2 3 4+
No Children Child Children Children Children
Mean of Dependent Variable (all states) 12.7% 15.1% 32.0% 21.1%
Repeal States Relative to All Non-Repeal States
Repeal*1946-1955 birth cohorts
Repeal*post-1955 birth cohorts





















Repeal States Relative to Non-Repeal States within 250 Miles of a Repeal State
Repeal*1946-1955 birth cohorts 1.55 -1.21 -1.65 0.34
(1.51) (1.09) (0.48) (0.57)
Repeal*post-1955 birth cohorts -0.07 -1.09 -1.35 1.89
(0.78) (0.44) (0.55) (0.55)
Sample Size (birth cohorts*states) 651 651 651 651
Repeal States Relative to Non-Repeal States between 250 and 750 Miles from a Repeal State
Repeal*1946-1955 birth cohorts 3.89 -1.75 -1.64 -1.00
(1.33) (1.07) (0.55) (0.50)
Repeal*post-1955 birth cohorts -0.45 -1.03 -1.15 1.43






Sample Size (birth cohorts*states) 744 744 744 744 744
Repeal States Relative to Non-Repeal States greater than 750 Miles from a Repeal State
Repeal*1946-1955 birth cohorts 5.45 -2.23 -2.44 -1.57 0.79
(1.42) (1.07) (0.58) (0.52) (0.43)
Repeal*post-1955 birth cohorts -0.53 -1.22 -2.14 1.05 2.83
(0.99) (0.54) (0.49) (0.58) (0.92)
Sample Size (birth cohorts*states) 496 496 496 496 496
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression represents the percentage of women who have no children, I child,
... , or 4 or more children by the end of childbearing. Data represents 1930 to 1960 birth cohorts. All specifications
include state and cohort-specific fixed effects along with state-specific trends. Standard errors are corrected for
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